26. The *Cold War International History Project* and the *Parallel History Project* are both online at <http://wwics.si.edu/> and <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/>. The CWIHP publishes working papers and other research work from Russian, East European, Chinese and Vietnamese scholars. See also Jaromir Navratil et al., *The Prague Spring 1968* (Budapest: Central European University (CEU) Press, 1998). Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil;* and Westad, *Brothers in Arms, passim,* for good examples of 'new cold war history'.
27. See Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); and Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
28. Richard Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2002), p.6; Keith Kyle, *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp.3–4.
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32. See, for example, Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta, 1999); the special issue of *Cold War History*, 'Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History', 4:1 (2003), edited by Patrick Major & Rana Mitter; and Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
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35. George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy, Power, and the Victory of the American ideal* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), p.892.

1
the international system

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How did the international system change during the cold war? How can this change be assessed within its broader chronological context? In other words, how does this change compare with what happened before and after? And what exactly do we mean by the phrase 'international system'? These are the broad questions which will be examined in this chapter. By mixing thematic approaches with chronological ones, this chapter will focus mainly on issues of political order and of international conflict, although economic, technological and intellectual aspects will at least be touched upon. After all, the cold war was a global struggle for power which impacted on many different spheres of public life.

As we shall see, the term 'cold war' is woefully imprecise, inviting a wide range of interpretations as to its chronology, content and historical significance. Neither is the term 'international system' one which can be used without putting into question a whole range of more or less explicit assumptions which underlie both its colloquial and academic use. Thus our overall question cannot be discussed profitably without referring to public as well as scholarly debates concerning these two terms. Anything less would result in a simple enumeration of events, institutions, norms and practices along the lines of a reference work. The purpose of this chapter, however, is not factual completeness. It is rather to contribute to an understanding of the world we live in and the extent to which it can (or cannot) be explained by historical reflection.

On re-reading many of the 'classics' of cold war history and of political science (particularly those on the subject of international relations), one cannot fail to note how often scholarship itself was an instrument of cold war politics. This is no surprise since the cold war was, among many other things, a battle over concepts for ordering political life both at a national and at a global level. To put it briefly, ideas and perceptions

mattered. Obviously, the proponents of Soviet communism wished for a different international order from the believers in liberal capitalism. When interpreting a particular event or structural problem of the international system one could hardly come to a conclusion without departing from a particular set of values. In turn those interpretations would often make assumptions about the future. How would the cold war develop? How would it end? Whose judgements were right? Whose were not?

Therefore the history of the cold war can readily be understood as a series of more or less false predictions of how world affairs would develop. This is true both at the intellectual and at the operational level. The diplomatic and military documents of the early post-war years are filled with gloomy expectations that major war was 'inevitable' within a short time frame. Neither Western leaders nor their contemporaries on the Eastern side could really believe that a period retrospectively called the 'long peace' had begun. They were too preoccupied with their recent historical experience, their thinking was too much shaped by the era of the two world wars to believe otherwise.[1]

Some years later, as the great powers armed themselves with ever more tanks, warships, aircraft, nuclear weapons and missiles, few people were ready to cast aside the 'old wisdom' that more weapons would make war more likely. During the 1960s, when neither the Soviet system nor Western capitalism looked ready to collapse any time soon, theorists concluded that both were essentially two varieties of modernisation which would become ever more alike over time (this being the so-called 'convergence theory'). Neither of the two propositions on 'convergence' or the inevitability of war turned out to be true. In Germany, most people at first could not believe that their country would be divided for long. Two decades later, from the 1960s onward, most people could not imagine that reunification would ever happen in their own lifetime. Indeed, some scholars claimed to have scientific proof that it would never happen, that the international peace order logically required the permanent division of Germany.[2] Neither did many people predict in the late 1950s that the United States would, for four long decades, keep well over 320,000 troops in Europe. By much the same logic most Sovietologists were convinced that Soviet military forces would forever stay where they had once pitched their tents. (It so happens that the Americans are still in Europe today, while the Soviets/Russians went home over a decade ago.[3]) These are only a few examples of mistaken concepts and forecasts, based undoubtedly on 'solid' historical experience, which at one time or another served as a basis for political decision-making as well as for scholarly analysis. As we all know, the end of the cold war came as a surprise to most governments and indeed to most academics. And neither of them did much better with respect to the post-cold war world.

But if the glass was half empty, it was also half full. Cold war history can also be written as a history of international learning, as a process in which a mixture of prudent calculation and historical experience served to avoid costly mistakes. On both sides of the iron curtain we find examples of crises resolved peacefully by wise statesmanship and by examples of prudent restraint in the use of power. Whether the 'long peace' was a product of the growing wisdom of international decision-makers is a good subject for debate, as is the question whether the exponential growth of international institutions and, more generally, of international economic interdependence (or globalisation) has anything to do with it. International organisations have a decidedly positive aura about them – as one can see from the fast-growing numbers of young professionals who wish to work for them. But, in reality, their place in the history of international relations has not been defined with sufficient precision. We do not yet know, for example, why they have not been more successful in reducing Third World poverty or tribal warfare.[4]

explaining the international system

Providing a definition of the term 'international system' is by no means a purely academic matter. The term 'system' somehow suggests that it functions according to certain rules. But this is hardly true. It merely sums up all the actors as well as all the material and immaterial factors which are somehow relevant to the way in which people, organisations and states relate to each other at a global level – hence the term 'international relations'. However, when we speak of an 'international order' (or 'world order') we mean a 'good', that is to say an accepted way of organising those relations. Thus the term 'order' suggests a value judgement about the way in which international relations should be organised. For example, it is obvious why the USSR and the Western liberal-democratic powers could not agree on a particular world order. Neither side could admit that the political system of its opponent was 'good' and therefore deserved a permanent place in the world. Logically, therefore, the cold war international system could at best be one in which 'stability' existed between the two sides, that is to say in which neither side attempted to overwhelm the other by use of force. By the same logic, stability allowed for crises, local (or 'limited') wars, and the 'balance of terror' (or nuclear deterrence combined with very large non-nuclear forces kept in readiness at all times). How then did this system function? To what extent was it

substantially different from the international systems before and after the cold war?

Classical 'realist' theories of international relations, such as those formulated by Hans Morgenthau and Raymond Aron, assume that states are the only actors in that 'system', that their most fundamental interaction is about war and peace, and that anarchy or chaos are better terms to describe world affairs.[5] This view seemed to reflect adequately the world situation during the early cold war years. It came to be challenged as international organisations and non-state actors both proliferated and appeared to gain more weight relative to state power.[6] Marxist as well as some non-Marxist writers considered economic factors to be more important than military ones, while other scholars drew attention to the role of small states.[7] 'Geopolitics', based on concepts espoused back in the nineteenth century, claimed that geography largely determined global power issues. Cultural explanations emphasised the importance of ethnicity, religion, and mentalities.[8] In other words, many felt that 'realism' addressed only a fraction of a much more complicated reality and that it overlooked the importance of cooperation between states, even states with all sorts of conflicts between them.

Although the cold war was obviously about a confrontation between two armed camps of states, it generated a progressively subtle 'game' of political understandings and relationships which forced scholars to adapt their terminology and their concepts. In retrospect, it seems that neither the pessimistic emphasis on war and peace ('realism') nor the optimistic concentration on cooperation and institutions ('institutionalism' or 'liberalism') do justice to the complexity of the issues to be addressed.[9] If some people, at the end of the cold war, expected to see a 'new world order' (George Bush Sr.), managed by 'an alphabet soup of international organisations' (to use Henry Kissinger's cynical phrase), the debates rapidly took another direction after 9/11 and after the third Gulf war of 2003.[10]

The historian of international relations should be aware that terminology and concepts can never quite match the varieties of change in world affairs. His or her preoccupation is to dissect that process of change, beginning perhaps with the three general observations. The first is to understand that new elements are often added to the system without displacing older ones. For example, it is common to argue that since the nineteenth century the nation-state came to be seen as the ideal form of political organisation. But in reality, older forms of organisation – from empires to clans – are still relevant political units in the twenty-first century. To speak of the international system as essentially an

assembly of states (the 'Westphalian system', which ostensibly dates from the treaties which concluded the Thirty Years War of 1618–48) is simply wrong. Secondly, we must bear in mind that international actors or familiar concepts such as capitalism or religion may retain their familiar names while changing their content. The same is true for states and other international actors. At the same time certain developments or actors acquire different names while remaining much the same. Today's globalisation, for example, does not differ fundamentally from developments within the world economy during the nineteenth century. One could well argue that financial markets were more internationalised before the First World War than they were during much of the cold war. Thirdly, certain forms or instruments of power in international life undergo changes which are not always taken into account in time, either by the political actors or by the analysts. For example, military power lost its value while economic and technological power became more important. One is even tempted to speak of cultural power when one thinks of the impact of popular culture, of the electronic media, or of such new international concerns as the place of women in society and human rights. In the final years of the cold war, the Soviet Union had more military power and more geographical space under its control than ever before. Yet it lacked the power possessed by the more advanced economies and the more attractive 'global' messages. The Pope in Rome still had no divisions – to paraphrase Stalin – but his message presented a serious challenge to the power of the CPSU in Moscow.

How can we identify those gradual, barely visible changes in international relations? One way is to look at statistics (for example, on population growth, trade or migration). But political decision-makers react only slowly or not at all to such numerical or behavioural changes. If we are to understand their learning processes we need to study those critical moments and decisions which indicate that established practices or concepts have become inadequate. This is obviously the case with international crises such as the Berlin blockade or the Cuban missile crisis. Typically, such crises lead to policy changes or even to the establishment of new international institutions or to new treaties. But there are also those 'quiet revolutions', which take place both inside national societies and between them, which are much harder to document and indeed to understand because they are not related to single political decisions or events. How, for example, does one explain those shifts in mentality which appear to underlie the decrease in religious beliefs or the drop in birth-rates since the 1960s? What exactly explains the lack in military enthusiasm in Japan and Germany after 1945? Or why did so many

people, during the 1950s, still believe in Soviet-style socialism when the evidence around them should have been sufficient to dissuade them?

explaining the cold war

What exactly do we mean by 'cold war'? Was it truly a period without 'hot' wars? Many in Western Europe tend to make this assumption because they see a sharp contrast between the era of two world wars and the post-1945 decades. But for people in South-East Asia, in certain parts of Africa, in South Asia or in the Middle East, those same years were filled with wars which destroyed human lives on a scale comparable to the world wars in Europe. China suffered some 65 million dead from its communist experiment.[11] The wars in Korea and Vietnam devastated the populations of both the Korean and Indochinese peninsulas.

Even the beginning of the cold war is a matter of some debate. If we assume it started around 1947, as most scholars do, the cold war appears to have been chiefly about territorial problems left unresolved by the Second World War. If, however, we focus on the ideological side of that great power struggle, we cannot but agree with André Fontaine and other early historians who saw the Bolshevist revolution of 1917 as the true starting point of the East–West conflict in which disputes over territories were only secondary concerns.[12] The most famous early explanation, laid down in the 'long telegram' drafted by George F. Kennan, the *chargé d'affaires* at the US embassy in Moscow, in early 1946. Kennan saw Bolshevist ideology as the main driving force to which the West somehow had to find a prudent response.[13] It was this 'orthodox' assessment of the causes of the cold war which 'revisionist' and leftist historians have sought to challenge from the late 1950s onwards.

For the decades after 1945 there is at least a rudimentary consensus how cold war chronology can be divided into well-defined periods. Few will disagree that the years between 1947 and 1953 marked a particularly 'cold' period, followed by a decade beginning with Stalin's death in March 1953 and lasting to the end of the Cuban missile crisis in late 1962 when major war was believed to be less likely but was still seen as a possibility. At that point a 'bipolar system' of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, became dominant. It was characterised by a certain confidence that 'the other side' would do anything it could to avoid nuclear war. Despite the frequent wars on a 'regional' scale, world politics became more stable. Around 1975 a number of important changes occurred which some contemporary observers and political activists at the time saw as the beginning of a 'new cold war'. The superpowers were unable to reach any agreements on arms control, while East–West tensions increased, particularly because of competing interests in the Middle East and in the 'Third World'. Finally, the arrival at the Kremlin of a new leadership in March 1985 marked an entirely new course in Soviet foreign policy which prepared the way for an extraordinary number of international understandings and changes in the international system.[14]

Did the cold war really end in 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in December of that year? In most respects it did, though communism remained in power in China, Vietnam, Cambodia, North Korea and Cuba. But some thinkers believe that the Soviet collapse did not fundamentally change international relations from a global perspective. Noam Chomsky and his followers point to the persistence of the gap between rich and poor (the North–South conflict) and the domination of world affairs by the hegemonic power of the United States, which undoubtedly increased after 1991.[15] For Robert Cox, the predominance of neo-liberalist policies, which in his view forms the overarching paradigm of world affairs, dates back to the 1970s and arrived by way of a more or less 'quiet revolution'.[16] In making his argument Cox obviously puts economic power above military power, a view which runs counter to many classical texts on the international system.

The cold war may be over, but we still feel its legacies almost daily. Therefore we still have a big stake in how the cold war is viewed. In turn this makes it both particularly hard to analyse it and particularly important to do so in a critical fashion, that is without being glued to scholarly dogma or established terminology. Perhaps some of the key differences in viewing the cold war international system are found less in what is described than what is left out. In that sense, contemporary opinion may be influenced by today's media-driven politics. People see a crowd of Arab protesters or a burning American flag or an oil-drenched waterfowl or the collapsing Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City – and they 'understand'. Do they comprehend pictures or newsreels of the Berlin blockade, the Korean war, the Berlin wall or the 'mushroom clouds' of nuclear explosions in the same way? And what about those events and shifts in world affairs for which we lack such images?

the roots of the cold war international system

The cold war belongs to a period in history which began long before either 1947 or 1917 and in which ideology was a means for justifying state power. During the nineteenth century, three new political ideologies

– liberalism, nationalism and radical socialism – had become powerful instruments for fighting the old monarchical order. Each was convinced that such change at the national level required a substantially different international system. Liberalism argued that the world would be safer and more prosperous if everyone adhered to democracy, free trade, private property and the rule of law. Nationalism was a force both to fight old social structures and to challenge the multi-ethnic empires which dominated global politics in those days. But by no means did the nation-state become its single political goal. While nationalism helped in creating Cavour's Italy and Bismarck's Germany, it also was a driving force in imperial rivalry and expansion. In 1898 even the United States, with their proud history of anti-imperialism (directed against Britain and Spain), began to acquire an empire and its own overseas sphere of influence. In 1917, the third ideology, social radicalism, produced a Bolshevist Russian empire which threatened to crush the other two ideologies. Far from leading to a united front against this challenge, the forces opposed to Bolshevism became critically divided. The Soviet threat produced a violently anti-democratic nationalist response which came to be known by its Italian name, fascism, because it was in Italy in 1922 that it first took over a national government. When Germany, in 1933, followed the Italian example in Hitler's 'national socialism', or Nazism, fascism was no longer a local response to economic and social crisis but a massive challenge to the international system.

Initially Hitler had focused on transforming Germany into a dictatorship, on overcoming the unemployment crisis and on getting rearmament under way. His demands for a revision of the Versailles peace treaty of 1919 barely exceeded earlier German demands made by democratic governments. But from 1938 his programme of expansionism and racism, outlined in *Mein Kampf* in 1926, was implemented brutally, leading to the assault on the Soviet Union in June 1941. Like Mussolini, who attempted imperial expansion in the Mediterranean and in Ethiopia, Hitler wanted to turn Germany into an empire. He sought to convert Eastern Europe, perhaps as far as the Urals, into a mixture of settlement colonies for Germans and dependent territories under German domination. The liberal powers, Britain, France and the United States, hesitated in their response both to the Soviet and to the Nazi challenge. Since the Soviet Union did not make war on other great powers – unlike revolutionary France in 1792 – it might be tolerated. One might overlook that its declaratory policy insisted that Bolshevist 'achievements' could only be secured if all opposition were overwhelmed, both inside and outside Russia. As to Nazi Germany, it might perhaps be balanced by Soviet

power and by Italy. But then the unexpected happened. Hitler formed a coalition with Stalin, which allowed him to conquer East-Central and much of Western Europe. Then his attack on the Soviet Union forced the liberal powers into a coalition with Stalin. Within a few weeks of the German invasion (22 June 1941), the United States, which was giving much support to the British but still refused to enter the war, extended its military aid to Britain's new ally. In December 1941, four days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hitler declared war on the United States. In this way he placed Washington firmly at the side of Moscow. Thus London and Washington never had a chance to refuse a coalition with Moscow, unless of course they were ready to meet Nazi Germany's terms. But given Hitler's brutal racist warfare, on a scale never before seen in history, a compromise with him was out of the question. The only practical option for the Anglo-Saxon powers was to proclaim an idealistic policy for a better world and to make as many concessions to Stalin as necessary in order to win Soviet support for such a new international order.

By 1943, when Soviet forces had gained the upper hand against the Germans, the two Anglo-Saxon powers began to realise fully what lay ahead. Not only was it now likely that the USSR would survive. It was equally likely that the Soviet leaders would use their armies to redraw the map of Europe, perhaps also of the Middle East and of East Asia. Communist expansion might now happen in the clothing of coalition warfare against Germany, Japan and their allies. Those fears are amply documented in the secret papers of British and American leaders, including their military advisers, but they could not be discussed publicly as long as the alliance with the Soviet Union was needed to win the war. The best available strategy to contain Soviet ambitions seemed to lie in a combination of establishing international rules and institutions on the one hand and in making concessions to the Soviets on the other. Based on those assumptions the US President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the British Prime Minister, Winston S. Churchill, conducted their coalition diplomacy for a new international system, while Stalin hoped to turn that strategy on its head. He would go along with the programme for a new international order and pocket any concessions offered by the West so long as either or both together did not limit his plans for communist expansion. As soon as the alliance was concluded Stalin's foreign secretary made it clear that the Kremlin intended to retain all territories which the Soviet Union had acquired under its treaty with Nazi Germany in August 1939. In the course of further negotiations, Konigsberg (later called Kaliningrad) with its surrounding territories, the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin peninsula, were

added to the Soviet wishlist. This appeared to be sound power politics, but how could it be justified to Western public opinion? How could it be squared with the British-American Atlantic charter (1941) which had promised that no territorial claims would be made?[17]

This tension between *Realpolitik* and international idealism could never be resolved. The most difficult territorial issue was Eastern Poland, since Britain and France had declared war on Germany after the German invasion of Poland. Polish soldiers were fighting alongside Western armies from the first to the last day of the war in Europe. Why should their country cede land to the Soviets who had once collaborated with Hitler in the destruction of Poland? The political strategy pursued by the British and the Americans was one of gradual adjustment to the Soviet territorial demands. Poland was compensated by transferring former German territories and by expelling their German populations. Though put in writing at the Potsdam conference, this transfer was termed provisional, pending a European peace conference. The Americans and British hoped that this would encourage the Soviet government to honour various agreements, among them an accord signed at Yalta on a freely elected Polish government. As we know, this hope was never fulfilled.[18]

Psychologically, as far as Western public opinion was concerned, the Sovietisation of Eastern Europe was not a simple issue of diplomatic betrayal. The wartime propaganda of a suffering Soviet people who bravely defended themselves, led by a firm but benevolent Stalin, was aggressively promoted by communist parties and groupings. They were particularly strong in France and Italy, and had considerable influence on the intelligentsia in Britain and America. Of influence were also the revelations of Nazi atrocities, in particular the liberation of the concentration camps in early 1945, the Nuremberg trials in 1945–46 and a considerable number of further war crimes trials concerning German atrocities on their Eastern front. Though the Holocaust did not become an international *lieu de mémoire* until much later, no one could be unmoved by the sheer scale of the atrocities and by the sufferings of the Soviet people.[19] Even in the USA, where the political left was much weaker than in Europe, there was a strong feeling that rather than being the result of Soviet expansionism, the cold war might have a hidden domestic agenda, that it might be directed against working-class rights, welfare benefits and liberal (left-wing) ideas.

the international system after 1945

It is in this political and psychological context that the new international order was established of which the United Nations, the World Bank, the

International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and a number of other institutions and treaties formed the backbone.[20] The Charter of the UN provided a set of norms which outlawed all wars except those conducted in self-defence, individually or collectively, and those military operations which the UN Security Council would mandate in response to an act of aggression. Together with the UN Declaration on Human Rights (1949) those documents laid down the essential norms of the new international system.

But how could liberalism, that is the project of a peaceful, democratic and humane international order, survive in this odd co-habitation with communism? Given the obstacles to 'normal' international relations between the two ideological camps and considering the frightening tensions between them one is surprised to see to what extent the USSR participated in the early negotiations for that new world order. Indeed, the Soviet government was prepared to underwrite political principles which all too obviously contradicted its official ideology and – so far as one can know – Stalin's true intentions. For example, at the Yalta conference Stalin signed the Declaration on Liberated Europe which specified that multi-party, free elections would be held in all liberated countries. With respect to Poland, the document even specified 'free, unfettered' elections. At Potsdam, he formally agreed to principles of political, social, and economic reforms for Germany which specifically prescribed practices of liberal democracy obviously alien to the Soviet system. What is more, the Soviet military authorities tasked with the implementation of those agreements honoured at least some of those principles (at least initially) or deviated from them only in secret. Obviously they wished to present a façade of political respectability. Was this merely an effort to mislead Western governments and public opinion, as some would argue, or did the Soviet leadership appreciate that it had a great deal to gain from such an international system of institutions and practices?

The answer may well lie somewhere in the middle. Stalin may have been undecided on how best to pursue his goals. Recent scholarship no longer assumes that Stalin had a ready-made strategy or overall plan in his desk. There are indications that he improvised a good deal. We have clear evidence that he did not permit Soviet-style coups d'état in Western Europe. In Eastern Europe his preference was for 'voluntary' Sovietisation, achieved by communist election victories and alliances with other political forces. In Germany, he apparently hoped for a withdrawal of Western military forces and for a gradual merger with the Eastern bloc, though a status of 'neutrality' might have been acceptable for a while.[21] While British and American officials noticed early on that

their Soviet colleagues were bending or even ignoring the rules, it took their governments two years to admit that Soviet compliance would probably not be forthcoming. Gradually, the West reacted with various forms of diplomatic protest, including the famous speech by President Truman on 17 March 1947 (later dubbed the 'Truman doctrine') which condemned Soviet policy on Greece and Turkey. This was followed by the equally famous Harvard speech of June 1947, made by the Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, in which the USA offered economic aid to Europe (the Marshall Plan). Two years later, after the Berlin blockade, the founding of the Atlantic alliance (eventually called NATO) formed part of a series of measures and institutions which served to answer Moscow's refusal to play by the rules and to keep their promises. Interestingly, however, none of those measures were explicitly directed against the USSR or challenged its status as a great power and empire.

What is surprising in hindsight is not the collapse of the wartime alliance but the very survival of the new international system even though, for several decades, it functioned only in part. While the United Nations failed to establish the kinds of military instruments envisaged in the charter and failed also to ban nuclear weapons (as suggested in 1946 with the Baruch Plan) it survived as a forum for debate on measures of arms control and later as an instrument for peace-keeping activities. The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent efforts to come to an agreement over the Palestinian question were perhaps the outstanding examples of UN activity during those early years. As for the rest, the new international system was off to a slow start as the Soviet Union stuck to its crude mixture of aggressive ideology and imperial expansion. From a pessimist's viewpoint the liberal project of a new international system existed mostly on paper.

crisis management and limited wars: korea and vietnam

How could war be avoided without giving in to Soviet political strategy which would ultimately destroy liberalism? One possible answer, as noted in Jussi Hanhimäki's chapter, was the policy of the 'containment' of Soviet power, as defined by Kennan. Yet even Kennan did not hesitate to suggest that the West, under American leadership, should pursue a vigorous secret policy designed to prevent the creation of further Soviet-type states. Propaganda, financial support for anti-communists, the supply of arms and even armed intervention, that is to say a wide range of covert action measures, would have to be used to prevent the further spreading of Soviet power. And since the Soviets had their own covert action measures, a number of conflicts developed in countries which were not openly placed in either political camp. Thus the cold war confrontation was not one in which war was absent but rather a state of affairs in which each side used all means of fighting so long as they did not provoke a third world war. Their strategies were aimed at 'stability' rather than peace.[22]

As the 'secret wars' and the 'limited wars' came to characterise cold war politics on virtually all sides, the Soviets were at a distinct advantage. They did not have a democratic public at home, critically watching where the money and the soldiers were being sent. Indeed, the Kremlin skilfully exploited those Western weaknesses by lending support to Western peace movements, to anti-colonial activists, and to a variety of left-wing organisations, including of course the communist parties. Soviet intelligence exposed what unsavoury support the West lent to brutal, corrupt right-wing dictators. Their policy of influence was particularly effective during the Vietnam war, not in the least because the USA had little or no support from their own allies. It also played a certain role in Western movements directed against nuclear armaments.[23]

While the two camps fought each other by secret means they also began to establish some informal ways of limiting their confrontation. After all, none of the great powers were prepared to go to war with each other over the unresolved issues of the 1940s. Though neither side was prepared to exclude the possibility of using force, both went to great lengths to avoid at least a direct military clash. This behaviour is perhaps best described as a kind of crisis management which was improved gradually, with each crisis, and which eventually resulted in some formal changes of the international system. The first Berlin crisis of 1948–49 set an important precedent in crisis management. It began as a conflict over economic policies in the four occupation zones of Germany and in the four Berlin sectors but suddenly escalated when the Soviets blocked all land access to the three Western sectors of Berlin. Significantly, they pretended to do 'repair work' on roads and railways rather than admitting that they were imposing an economic blockade. In this way they did not technically violate any written agreements. None existed because in 1945 access to Berlin by land and by inland waterways had been understood to be implicit in the presence of occupation forces. On their part, the Western allied powers responded by organising an airlift of unarmed military transport aircraft which travelled along the air corridors prescribed by the 1945 four-power air agreement. (Even during the Berlin blockade air access was administered by a board of military officers which included Soviet representatives!) In other words, no side directly violated written agreements, though the Soviets clearly acted

against the spirit of the Potsdam agreement. Each side was careful not to give the impression of an imminent military attack, though military personnel and equipment were abundantly visible. While the Soviets sought to demonstrate that Berlin was at their mercy, the Western powers were able to show off their superior air capacity which made it possible to keep the West Berliners supplied with food stuffs and fuel. In the end the Berlin airlift turned into a propaganda victory for the West, particularly for the USA, in winning the hearts of the Germans and of many others in Europe. War was avoided and the Soviets returned to the conference table even though two German states were already in the process of being established. Inadvertently Stalin convinced the Europeans of the necessity for the Marshall Plan and of the need to forge a Western defence alliance led by the Americans.[24]

In East Asia, the confrontation took a very different form. The Chinese regime change created a complex set of issues concerning the international status of Taiwan. China's permanent membership on the UN Security Council effectively incapacitated that body because the Soviet Union insisted that this seat be transferred to the Beijing government, instead of leaving it in the hands of President Chiang Kai-Shek (Jiang Jieshi), whose *Guomindang* government had fled to Taiwan (China's seat was not transferred to Beijing until 1971). In the middle of this imbroglio the North Korean communists began an assault across the international demarcation line (along the 38th parallel) in June 1950. In response the United States assembled an international coalition force under UN sponsorship. US strategy was based on the assumption that the feeble North Korean regime would not have undertaken such a dramatic step without political and indeed military backing from Moscow. When the communist Chinese regime sent 'volunteer' forces across the border to fight alongside the North Koreans the war assumed a very different dimension. Was Korea only the testing ground for a wave of communist military offensives elsewhere, particularly in Central Europe? Was the real aggressor sitting in the Kremlin? Surely the Soviets had a certain number of 'military advisers' in Korea. But Western intelligence services could not detect any major preparations for a Soviet attack. Therefore the USA was careful to conduct the Korean war as a 'limited war', that is to say as a conflict without direct great power involvement on both sides. In this way the UN military commander, US General Douglas MacArthur, was left to deal with a thorny issue. How could he conduct combat against the Chinese 'volunteer' forces without bringing China into the war, thereby without involving the Soviets who had signed a Chinese-Soviet

friendship treaty in February 1950? Should he bomb Chinese supply lines and send his ground forces across the border to China? From a military standpoint this was the logical way. MacArthur coined the famous phrase that 'in war there is no substitute for victory'. But Truman recalled him, to howling protests from the American political right. While the number of soldiers and civilians killed was immense – perhaps as many as 2 million Koreans (on both sides) and well over 50,000 US soldiers – the Korean war remained a 'limited war'. It was followed by an equally 'limited' one in Indochina, fought between 1946 and 1973 first by France and then by the United States.[25]

It is important to note that this restraint on the part of the West was exercised at a moment when the Soviet Union had performed its first atomic test but was still far from having deployable bombs, let alone any means of delivery at intercontinental distances. Therefore Truman's decision was not so much motivated by a fear of Soviet retaliation, though his British allies did indeed fear a retaliatory Soviet attack in Europe, than by a sense that the international system should somehow be preserved. This was possible because neither the Korean war nor the later conflict in Indochina was in any sense a war of American self-defence. Those wars were not even fought on behalf of or for the protection of an indispensable ally (the defence alliance with Japan was not signed until a year after the end of the Korean war). Rather, they were fought for great power leadership and for a certain idea which the United States had about the international system. Thus America's war in Korea was a global message – made with reference to Europe and to South-East Asia in particular – that the policy of containment allowed for regional wars and that the use of nuclear weapons could not be forecast. To emphasise the latter point the US deployed nuclear-armed bombers both to Britain and to bases in East Asia. Obviously those strategic forces had no tactical purposes either in Korea or in Germany. Their potential targets were in the Soviet Union and in China.

The American war effort in Vietnam was less obviously an effort to contain Soviet power, though Moscow supplied arms to Hanoi. It was even fought at a time when Soviet-American arms control negotiations were under way. In the end it was no longer even directed against Beijing, as President Richard Nixon made his spectacular visit to China in 1972. The Americans ended up fighting a Third World communist country, North Vietnam, which they could not defeat and whose dependence on Soviet and Chinese support did not translate into subservience to Moscow or Beijing. For the United States the Vietnam war began as a proxy conflict in support of the French, whose efforts to reassert

themselves in Indochina (1946–54) at first received minimal support from Washington. From 1949 to 1950 US engagement grew rapidly, both financially and with covert support, and was intended both to contain communism in South-East Asia and to bolster the USA's alliance with a key European ally. After partition in the Geneva accords of 1954, which terminated French engagement in Indochina, the US attempted (initially by covert means) to preserve an anti-communist regime in South Vietnam. From the late 1950s the Americans attempted to defeat the Viet Cong's insurgency (which received full backing from Hanoi from 1960 onwards) but essentially they kept alive a corrupt regime with an incompetent military. The myth of 'counter-insurgency' influenced a generation of US leaders, among them President John F. Kennedy, who believed he had the magic bullet for fighting communism. By late 1963 there were 16,000 US 'advisers' in Vietnam. In August 1964, after a naval incident off the North Vietnamese coast in the Gulf of Tonkin, the US Congress gave President Lyndon B. Johnson wide-ranging powers to escalate the war, enabling his administration to order air raids on the North from February 1965. Eventually Johnson deployed ground troops to South Vietnam in the spring of 1965, bringing the peak total to 550,000 in 1968. The US military presence grew because more limited campaigns had failed to defeat the Vietnamese communists, who were supported by the Soviets as well as the Chinese, and to establish a viable non-communist regime in South Vietnam. The result was a crushing political defeat for the Americans and, with 2 million dead, a terrible outcome for the Vietnamese people. In April 1975 the Americans withdrew their last officials by helicopter from the roof of the US embassy in Saigon. All of Vietnam was now communist. But this no longer mattered to the cold war international system. The USA had long before opened an era of negotiations with the USSR and with China.[26]

It is important to remember that both the Korean and the Vietnam wars were fought by coalitions for which America's extensive system of defence treaties provided an indispensable basis, both politically and militarily (discussed in further detail in Lawrence Kaplan's chapter). Beginning with the treaties concluded with the Philippines and Japan in August–September 1951, this alliance system eventually included Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Britain, France, Pakistan and Thailand. Yet it did not amount to a regional peace order, as NATO did on the European side. At most it supplied the USA with some fighting troops and with a large number of air and naval bases, storage and recreation facilities which were used extensively during those two Asian wars.

nuclear weapons, arms control and the helsinki accords

Despite its crises and wars the cold war international system had a remarkable history of negotiations and of institution-building across the iron curtain. Immediately after Stalin's death in March 1953 the idea of great power cooperation resurfaced. Churchill, who was re-elected Britain's Prime Minister in October 1951, proposed a follow-up summit meeting to the 1945 Potsdam conference where the remaining European issues could be resolved. Truman's successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, subsequently suggested one scheme for cooperating on civilian nuclear matters (known as 'Atoms for Peace') and another for reducing the fear of surprise attack (the 'Open Skies' proposal). Though neither were successful they signalled a willingness to discuss the new problems of a nuclear-armed cold war. They also assured Soviet leaders that their country was regarded as a legitimate great power and that even its new empire of satellite states might be removed quietly from the list of unresolved issues. At the same time the Soviets accepted for practical purposes the political arrangements which the USA, Britain and France had made with the Germans in the Western zones of occupation by creating the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1949, and with Japan a few years later.

As noted by Lawrence Freedman and Geraint Hughes in their chapter, the emerging Soviet nuclear arsenal became an issue of great concern in the West. Though there was nothing in international law which prevented a sovereign state from acquiring any weapon it chose to develop and although the USSR as a permanent member of the UN Security Council had a special responsibility to defend the international system against aggressors, there remained the issue of its totalitarian political system. Would the Soviets build up their arsenal only for purposes of deterrence and self-defence or might they, in accordance with their stated ideological goals, regard nuclear weapons as a means to force the export of communism? In the latter case, would it be prudent or even necessary to destroy the Soviet nuclear programme before it could be a threat on a global scale? This last point was indeed raised by some in the United States, particularly by a few senior military figures, but it never became policy. Eisenhower, for example, forbade any of his officials from even considering this option.[27] Therefore the US response to the Soviet weapons programme remained what Truman had decided as early as January 1950, a few months after the first Soviet test. They would build a very large nuclear arsenal, including almost unimaginably destructive hydrogen bombs. And they would equip the armed services with such weapons as fast as delivery systems could be constructed and

built. Moreover, the USA would seek to stay ahead technologically and to protect their allies so far as feasible.[28]

The evolution of nuclear strategy and the related technologies and deployments – discussed by Freedman and Hughes, and by Bluth, in the respective chapters – shaped to a considerable degree 'how the cold war was played' (to quote Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser from 1977 to 1980).[29] After the 1946 failure to ban nuclear weapons by international agreement, the first reaction on the part of the great powers was to acquire those weapons for the simple reasons that they might serve as a deterrent and that ownership would convey international prestige. Thus the Soviet and British programmes came under way as early as 1945–46, even before the cold war was publicly admitted to exist. A decade later the French began work on their own nuclear deterrent. In making this decision, Britain could build on its expertise from the Manhattan Project while France was much further behind and could devote fewer resources to the task. The lack of US support for the development of the French *force de frappe* would eventually lead President Charles de Gaulle to cool off his relations with Washington and to leave the military structures of NATO in 1966.

The primary purpose of nuclear weapons was to threaten any major attacker with the grave risk of a counter-strike of enormous dimensions. It is this idea of an existential guarantee, certainly for a nation and perhaps also for a particular political regime, which has survived into the post-cold war era and which possibly lies at the heart of the Israeli, Indian, Pakistani, North Korean and Iranian nuclear programmes. Whether or not any of those states also intends to annihilate a particular enemy (Iran vis-à-vis Israel for example) is unclear. Surely such an intention cannot be completely ruled out. For the great powers, nuclear arsenals could be seen as an expression of their status as members of the Security Council. But what of the implications for other states? Should they acquire nuclear arms? Should they seek protection (a 'nuclear umbrella') from one of the great powers? Could such protection be trusted? Would the world become more dangerous with the number of nuclear-armed states increasing? One answer was to promote a policy of nuclear non-proliferation, a policy which originated right at the beginning of the nuclear age. When Britain, the USA and Canada began their Manhattan Project, they did so with the intention of excluding their Soviet ally. As it turned out, Soviet scientific competency combined with a substantial spying effort (discussed in Richard Aldrich's chapter) allowed the Soviets to catch up quickly.[30] In turn, the Soviets gave limited support to a Chinese nuclear project but did not allow other communist allies to proceed along that route. Similarly, from the late 1950s the USA gave limited support to the British nuclear programme but sought to discourage other Western powers from developing their own national programmes. Among those, only France refused to submit to US pressure and produced its first test in 1960.

When Soviet–British–American negotiations on non-proliferation began in the mid-1960s, they found common ground in excluding Germany from the nuclear weapons club. The resulting Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in 1970, implicitly left the door open for France and China to be recognised as club members. All others would henceforth be classified as non-nuclear weapons states. After years of further negotiations nearly all states accepted the NPT. But the refusal on the part of India, Pakistan and Israel sent a signal around the world, in part because Israel was a close military and political ally of the USA. To preserve the notion of equal sovereignty the 'haves' promised to the 'have-nots' that their superiority would be a temporary situation, ending with the eventual abolition of all nuclear weapons. In 1995, when the NPT was turned into a permanent feature of the international system, that promise barely survived.[31]

The existence of nuclear weapons made it difficult for the two superpowers to credibly threaten each other with attack, because of the consequences war would have for both sides. With the exception of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis (discussed in Chapter 5), the USA and the USSR shied away from making specific threats to employ nuclear weapons against each other. It was significant that in the aftermath of this crisis Washington and Moscow signed a number of agreements, which included the establishment of a direct telephone link (a 'hot-line') between the White House and the Kremlin and the conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963, the NPT and the anti-ballistic missile treaty of 1972. The two superpowers made the public believe that nuclear war was becoming less likely, when in reality the deployment of intercontinental missiles in silos and on nuclear-powered submarines made it much easier technically to launch a devastating first-strike. In the end public sentiment did more to define the international system than did military reality. For much the same reason the Soviet, then Russian, and the US arsenals could be drastically reduced after the end of the cold war. While their remaining stockpiles still exceeded any 'reasonable' needs, they no longer appeared to concern the US or European publics. Eventually nuclear weapons only remained a public issue if owned or aspired to by those outside the circle of 'legitimate' powers of the NPT.

Forcing this type of arms control logic on the allies of the USA and the USSR did not happen easily. During the 1960s, NATO in particular went through seemingly endless transatlantic crises centred around the fear of unequal security among its membership. If nuclear weapons had defensive functions why should smaller states such as France, Germany and Italy renounce part of their right to self-defence? If they did not, as anti-nuclear activists claimed, why deploy US nuclear warheads in Europe? Eventually, in 1966, only France gave a clear answer by leaving the military structures of NATO and requesting the withdrawal of all US forces from her territory. The others grudgingly gave in to Washington, hoping no doubt to save defence expenditures in return for their second-class status.

Although the cold war was a hot and bloody war for much of the Third World, those conflicts had remarkably little impact on the international system. Perhaps one can say that the great powers remained too colonialist in spirit to permit the kind of revolution 'from the villages' which Mao Zedong and other theoreticians of Third World revolutions had envisaged. Surely the anti-colonial rhetoric of both the USA and the USSR had little effect on how each of them dealt with their clients from the poor South of the globe. Each demanded obedience in return for military and civilian aid. Each sought to impose its ideology and its national interests, whereby security concerns and the 'correlation of forces' (a Soviet term for some kind of balance of power thinking à la Moscow) were more important than the strict enforcement of ideology. Local cultures were tolerated so long as they did not interfere with grand strategy as defined by the two supreme hegemons. Initially, a number of other powers sought to maintain a role in this new mixture of colonialism and cold war politics. In the name of anti-communism and 'counter-insurgency' the Netherlands fought to regain Indonesia until 1949. France did the same in Indochina and later in Algeria (from 1954 to 1962), as did the British in today's Malaysia during the 1950s. The British-French attempt to impose their will on Nasser's Egypt in 1956 (the Suez crisis) is surely the best-known case in which the USA told its allies to leave the new 'great game' to Washington. Eventually, American oil interests became interwoven with cold war politics, leading the USA to expand its influence throughout the Middle East, leaving Britain with only a minor role to play in the region. Portugal maintained its own mixture of colonial and anti-communist warfare in Angola and Mozambique until 1974. South Africa did the same in both countries (and also Namibia) until 1989. The USA fought or supported such wars in Latin America, particularly in Guatemala and Nicaragua, from the 1960s through the

1980s. In each case there was some truth in claims of a communist danger, but the raw business and geo-strategic self-interests was only too obvious. Only South Africa's *apartheid* regime was too obnoxiously racist to give even an appearance of anything else, but even there Western support – and later the weakness of Western sanctions policies – was justified by cold war necessity.

To be sure, this expansion of the cold war international system did not come easily and did not always overcome local resistance. Within the Islamic world a strong movement against both Soviet and US hegemony evolved. Iran after the 1979 revolution, Ghadafi's Libya and the fast-growing Moslem fundamentalist groups in several Arab states are obvious examples of this resistance. The war in Afghanistan, after the Soviet invasion of 1979, did much to extinguish those earlier hopes of an Arab nationalism supported by Soviet arms and other aid which the Baathist movement of the 1950s had fostered in Syria and later in Iraq. The USA was quite ready to support such forces, particularly those directed against the Soviets in Afghanistan, without asking for any recognition of Western democratic values or human rights in return. As a consequence, Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda, once an indirect beneficiary of US clandestine support, grew to become an important terrorist organisation on a global scale, chiefly directed against US influence in the Middle East.[32] When the Soviets became more actively involved in Africa, following the 1973 coup d'état in Ethiopia and the collapse of the Portuguese empire the following year, the USA responded by expanding its covert operations in support of anti-communist 'local' forces (such as, for example, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement in Angola). As a result, sub-Saharan Africa became a cold war battlefield. Similarly, Soviet support for various central American civil war parties was countered by Washington. After the US Congress sought to limit such aid to the *Contras* in Nicaragua (the guerrilla groups fighting the left-wing *Sandinista* regime), the administration of Ronald Reagan made a deal with Iran to send money to the *Contras* in return for military equipment Iran needed in its bloody war against Iraq (1980–88). This was in spite of the fact that during this same war, the longest conventional war after 1945, the USA supported Iraq – as did other Western powers and the Soviet Union in different ways and at different times.[33]

If the policies of both Western and Eastern bloc countries towards the Iran–Iraq conflict illustrated the absurdity of applying cold war logic to the Third World, this was by no means the only such case. The original ideological positions of the cold war were utterly compromised when applied forcibly and by clandestine methods to the Third World. Neither

Lenin's Bolshevist variety of communism nor Roosevelt's liberal democracy combined with market capitalism retained any recognisable value during the proxy wars which characterised the cold war confrontation of the 1970s and 1980s.

economic, social and cultural changes in the international system

When the membership of the United Nations increased from 51 founding members in 1945 to 166 in 1991, the UN became to a large degree an organisation concerned with development issues. In 1964, the UN's first UNCTAD conference marked the beginning of its new role in what were later called North–South relations. The World Bank was transformed from an organisation concerned with rebuilding war-torn Europe to a lender for development capital in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Development policy therefore became part of international relations.

But what were the principal concepts for dealing with under-development? Not surprisingly the cold war had a major effect both on the guiding ideas and on their application. At the outset there were two opposing concepts. Liberals assumed that 'freedom from want' (to quote Roosevelt) could be achieved quickly by following the successful examples of industrialisation in the Western world, telescoped into one or two generations. Marxist-Leninists, however, held that poverty was essentially the result of an unequal distribution of riches rather than one of creating wealth and of allocating it efficiently by market forces. They believed that forced industrialisation along the Soviet model, with the state organising and owning capital investment, would produce quick results. As it turned out, both concepts were essentially state-oriented. Both put the emphasis on large infrastructure projects such as dams for irrigation and for hydroelectric plants, airports, harbours, roads and urban construction. Industrial investment was directed toward large industrial plants such as steel mills and cement works. And both concepts underestimated 'local conditions' as well as cultural and social factors. When it became apparent that those factors impeded rapid growth of per capita incomes in most countries, governments were mostly incapable of allocating investment wisely. As a result, huge amounts of money were wasted in corruption. Eventually the West insisted on a market-driven approach with a focus on social improvement. This became the new gospel of development policies which began in the 1980s.

Overall, however, the results were deeply disappointing. While nearly all countries experienced various forms of partial modernisation, high population growth rates and a breakdown of traditional social structures put an end to the most optimistic scenarios. There appeared to be no overall concept which would deliver sufficient wealth to improve everyone's life and which would establish a sound economic basis for robust democratic structures. Nevertheless, development politics generated a vast array of international bureaucracies and NGO (non-governmental organisations) transnational bodies. At least at that level it produced plenty of jobs.

How did those activities and institutions fit into the wider picture of transnational economic politics during the cold war? One must go back at least to the 1930s to appreciate the wider context. After the liberal system of free exchange of goods, capital and labour had been smashed by the First World War, the inter-war years produced various ideologies of self-sufficiency or autarky which cast a long shadow on much of the cold war era. The Bretton Woods system professed to favour market policies, but in reality most countries acted on the belief that political prestige abroad and social stability at home required national, that is protectionist, answers. The attempts to restore the European empires were one expression of this conviction. The creation of economic zones of cooperation, secured by tariffs and trade limitations, was another.

As Alan Milward has argued, European integration which began with the Marshall Plan of 1947 and which was eventually based on the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) proposed by France in 1951, belonged in that category. It provided for protection and for governmental management in those economic sectors where purely national policies were insufficient.[34] In 1949 the Soviets created the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or Comecon) as a zone of economic planning and privileged trade with their satellites in Eastern Europe. As to the Americans, their declaratory policy of free trade stood in stark contrast with their strong tradition of self-sufficiency. Their unique economic strength, however, made it possible for them to pursue a parallel strategy of market penetration both in terms of foreign investment by their giant corporations and in privileged access to 'strategic' resources such as oil, uranium and metals.[35] Therefore, the Bretton Woods institutions never came to full fruition. The free exchange of capital, based on the dollar-gold standard, only functioned between 1959, when key Western currencies became fully convertible (Japan followed in 1964), and 1971 when Nixon, under pressure from the financial burden of the Vietnam war, abandoned the gold standard. Free trade under GATT took even longer to materialise.

Eventually, the international system came to be characterised by a separation of economic and politico-military power. Certain countries such as West Germany, Japan and South Korea reached enormous levels of production and wealth but remained 'dwarfs' in the traditional state-based forms of political power. After France and Britain emerged from the trauma of decolonisation they found their place as middle powers, although they possessed permanent seats on the UN Security Council and the elevated status of being 'legitimate' nuclear powers under the NPT. Western Europe saw an extraordinary 'economic miracle', as did some smaller East Asian states (the 'tiger economies'), while the economic predominance of the USA diminished. Latin America, South Asia, China and the Soviet Union fell far behind or stagnated. The Soviet Union and China were great powers but without playing significant roles on the economic stage of fast-growing trade volumes.

The oil crises of the 1970s, resulting from the October 1973 Yom Kippur war and the Iranian revolution of 1979, demonstrated that the USA and Western Europe were now vulnerable to economic and political pressures from Arab oil-producing countries which had no marketable products or services for the growing world economy beyond crude oil and natural gas, and which were insignificant in military terms. But the damage to American power was only temporary because the smaller and medium sized countries within the Western camp were even more defenceless and were thereby forced into a common response under US leadership. Moreover, the Soviets could only benefit from the increase in oil prices to a very limited degree. Their petroleum industry suffered from chronic under-investment. Their production and transportation costs (particularly for Siberian oil wells) were dramatically higher than those of the Persian Gulf states. At best the Soviets could somewhat benefit from the loss of prestige which the capitalist West suffered in the Moslem world. Neither was China in a position to benefit in substantial ways. Its economy had been gravely disturbed by a series of economic disasters – most of them attributable to communist policies – which, after Mao's death in 1976, forced the new leadership into dramatic changes in economic policy (the 'four modernisations' under Deng Xiaoping).

When the enormous Middle Eastern oil-revenues reached the world's financial markets, they came in the form of 'petrodollars'. Much of this money could not be absorbed by the oil states themselves, at least not quickly, and had to be invested in the advanced Western economies if it was to yield satisfactory returns. Again, the communist part of the world simply could not compete for investment opportunities. Neither could it provide those consumer or investment goods which

the newly-rich oil barons wished to buy. While the Kremlin leaders benefited somewhat from exporting Soviet oil for much better prices, their communist clients suffered because the 'domestic' price for Soviet oil was gradually adjusted to international levels. In turn this price hike led to soaring state deficits all around Eastern Europe. By borrowing from the West those countries dramatically pushed up their indebtedness in hard-currency denomination. This resulted in a slowdown of investment and, by the late 1980s, led several states to bankruptcy. Their weakened governments would eventually prepare the way for the political revolutions of 1989.[36]

The cumulative effects of the oil crises were felt hardest in the developing countries because their own prices for many of their agricultural products and for various other raw materials dropped dramatically. Many of them lacked the money or even the credit to keep up their declining infrastructure from colonial times, or to modernise their post-independence plants. A few, such as Nigeria and Venezuela, became major oil producers but largely failed to make good use of their new riches for their societies. Others, like Bolivia and later Afghanistan, became ever deeper involved in international drug-dealing. Generally speaking, the great majority of developing countries were poorly equipped and given little opportunity to benefit from the dramatic growth of the global economy which in turn encouraged a renewal of economic liberalism, often called monetarism or neo-liberalism.[37]

The full extent of this revolution in economic policies, both at the national and at the international level, can only be appreciated if one first looks at those older concepts of state interference which preoccupied the wealthy countries of the West during the 1950s and 1960s. At that time the state owned and ran most public services (railways, airlines, utilities, postal services, health services etc.). In some countries, notably Britain and France, the state even owned automobile works, steel mills, coal mines, banks and insurances because they were considered too important for the national well-being to be left to private ownership. In parallel, huge government provisions for healthcare, education, old age pensions, labour market intervention and unemployment relief had evolved into a welfare state which consumed around 50 per cent of GNP, in some cases even more. If one takes into account that in those same countries, before 1914, the state had consumed a share of around 10–15 per cent of GNP, one sees the fundamental change which occurred during and after the First World War. No doubt that increase in state spending was a response to the 'challenge of socialism', including the challenge posed by the Soviet Union. It was thus – at least in part – a result of the pre-1947 cold

war to which reference is made above. During the world economic crisis of the 1930s even the United States introduced most of those welfare state provisions, though America was much less threatened by the Soviet example than was Europe after 1918 and again after 1944–45. While the US public sector, after 1945, was significantly smaller than in Western Europe, the pressure for economic protection and for public investment was stronger than many 'internationalist' Americans cared to admit.

In hindsight it may be difficult to believe how many economists and scientists came to believe that the Soviet version of modernity might be equal or even superior to the Western one, citing Soviet advances in space flight (such as the launch of the *Sputnik* satellite of 1957) as well as the quality and superior numbers of scientists and engineers. During the 1960s the proponents of 'convergence theory' argued that the gap between the two systems would eventually diminish, and that capitalism would acquire characteristics of socialism (and vice versa). The habitual forgery of government statistics by the communist regimes, the disheartening testimony of refugees, and reports about the mistreatment of human rights were routinely brushed aside as temporary problems of 'late development' or of the 'mistakes of Stalinism'. It was against this philosophy of the welfare state and the rosy pictures of the Soviet system that both Reagan and the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, propagated their new policies of cutting back state intervention and welfare provisions during the 1980s. At the same time they espoused a new militancy vis-à-vis Soviet power. Reagan refused to follow the path of merely managing Soviet military power via arms control. His Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was as much a political and ideological programme as is was a technical one. Thatcher's neo-liberal rhetoric and policies propagated a modern, individualistic capitalism based on personal liberty. It was nothing less than an intellectual declaration of war on left-wing politics. Her 'bible', Friedrich von Hayek's *Road to Serfdom*, is an anti-communist manifesto which takes economics only as a starting point for a militantly anti-socialist political philosophy.[38]

Interestingly, the Thatcher–Reagan economic vision was followed only guardedly elsewhere in the West. For example, West Germany's Christian-Democrat Chancellor, Helmut Kohl (1982–98), spoke much of a 'spiritual turnabout' (*geistige Wende*) toward traditional values but refused to cut welfare benefits. He did, however, embrace the idea of privatising telephone and public transport services as well as a number of other state-owned businesses and services. Other governments in Western Europe followed suit, even in France where President François Mitterrand began his 14 years in office (1981–95) by nationalising certain enterprises

and by increasing state spending. Privatisation and market deregulation became part of the international economic agenda. The GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, renamed the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994) oversaw a process in which markets were opened and obstacles to 'fair trading' were removed. The World Bank and the IMF increasingly made their loans contingent on the recipients' adherence to this new creed. As a result a considerable number of threshold countries and even of poor countries suddenly found themselves forced to cut their welfare programmes and subsidies. The European Union (EU) – under the leadership of Commission President Jacques Delors, a French socialist – embarked on a vast programme of privatisation and competition policies which produced a remarkable impetus to private capitalism. From a framework for market restriction and market regulation the EU rapidly transformed itself into an engine for improving international competitiveness, brushing aside traditional economic policies dear to social democrats and labour unions.[39]

To what extent did those changes impact on the international system and its institutions? And how did the communist world respond? Through a series of complicated and drawn-out negotiations the agenda of the GATT (tariff reduction and harmonisation of global trade) was gradually implemented. The Kennedy Round of 1967 cut tariffs for industrial products by half. The Tokyo Round, concluded in 1979, sought to reduce government subsidies. Systematically, all forms of open or hidden discrimination against 'foreign' products and services were being targeted and in large measure eliminated. But other changes, particularly those brought about by the 'computer revolution', took place almost without political or institutional backing. Political actors found themselves driven by the effects of such innovations rather than controlling them. In other words, the international system changed not so much by design as it did by innovation in science and technology. Electronic communication made it nearly impossible for dictatorships to shield their publics from other cultures, other ideas, and from news about their own countries distributed from outside. Radio, television, cassette recorders and copying machines became powerful sources of unauthorised information, used by dissident forces of different sorts. They made obsolete those aspects of state sovereignty which communist leaders (and other dictators) had vigorously defended. Information, capital (legal and illegal) and intellectual property could now be exchanged at a rate never seen before.

If technology made distances less important and borders permeable, a growing international division of labour made countries and societies

ever more interdependent. Economic globalisation, which had started with European colonialism as far back as the fifteenth century, built its own structures, now often called networks, which far outstripped the corset of international institutions established in the wake of the Second World War. Aside from private corporations and those older transnational institutions relating to religions, to science and to cultural activities, there arrived on the world stage a new class of actors known as NGOs. Their concerns included human rights (Amnesty International was founded in 1961), ecological concerns (Greenpeace in 1971 and World Wildlife Fund in 1961), and social welfare (*Médecins sans Frontières* (Doctors without Borders) in 1971). Their mission was to challenge the very notion that sovereignty could somehow legitimise the systematic violations of human rights, the isolation of societies and damage done to the global environment. Whether those economic and technical developments, combined with the proliferation of non-state networking activities, would eventually sweep away the traditional nation-state remains open to question.[40]

Fundamental changes in cultural norms also had their impact on the cold war international system. What is often referred to as the transition to post-modernity began to change cold war politics in the West. During the 1960s a younger post-1945 generation no longer felt threatened by communism and began to oppose the 'cold war consensus' which, for example, underpinned US intervention in Vietnam. Increasingly, representatives of this generation rejected the logic of 'mutually assured destruction' which dictated the deployment of ever more sophisticated nuclear missiles. Ecological concerns (expressed by Green parties) and lifestyle issues (such as abortion and gay rights) came to take precedence over the ideas and values which had driven the cold war policies from the 1940s to the 1960s. Those new movements not only imitated each other around the globe but also formed powerful networks of cooperation and exchange. Many of their concerns were eventually enshrined in international agreements and regimes, monitored by international institutions. Waste management, emission control and wildlife preservation are among the better-known examples. Those new technologies and new international concerns essentially came from the rich Western countries who often failed to comprehend that their pet notion of 'sustainable development' had a very different ring in Third World countries. The campaigns for preserving the rain forests are just one example where the daily needs of the local populations were widely disregarded. The idea of limiting growth to save the planet, powerfully propagated by a best-selling study from the Club of Rome (1971), was

only one of those eco-pessimist contributions which shaped international debates but paid insufficient attention to the needs and hopes of the world's poor nations.[41]

In the Soviet Union the combination of technological and cultural change came to subvert the political system, too. While Moscow built for itself and for its allies a vast, unconquerable arsenal of weaponry, the performance of its civilian economy increasingly lagged behind. Some modest advances consumer goods and a cautious relaxation of the empire's cultural isolation (admitting pop music and jeans, for example) only alerted the younger generation to all the Western goods and the individual freedom which they lacked. By signing the Helsinki Final Act at the end of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in August 1975 the Kremlin leadership obtained international legitimacy for the ways in which it had forcibly reordered the political landscape of Eastern Europe. But by conceding to include human rights provisions ('Basket III' of the negotiations) it allowed foreign journalists to work inside the Soviet bloc. Civil rights movements and ecological movements communicated their concerns to the world. The Polish independent labour union 'Solidarity', and prominent dissidents like Vaclav Havel or Andrei Sakharov became familiar figures around the globe, representing a new feeling of 'one world' in which state borders and nineteenth-century ideologies looked redundant.

conclusions

A decade and a half after the end of the cold war the long-term significance of its international system is open to widely divergent interpretations. Our own post-cold war perspectives have changed several times since then, leaving behind them a trail of mistaken notions and predictions. The failure to establish a 'new world order' after 1991 is directly related to them. It took the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 to realise how Western covert operations in Afghanistan against the Soviet Red Army (during the 1980s) helped foster radical Islam. It can be argued that the American-British 2003 Iraq war may well be another one of those post-cold war intellectual failures.[42]

Other parts of the cold war's ending were managed remarkably well. New actors were brought into the major cold war institutions, thus enabling them to manage the transition to a new era of global affairs. NATO and the EU expanded into Eastern Europe. The Russian Federation and a new outward-looking China began to play those roles within the United Nations which Churchill and Roosevelt had originally envisaged.

The WTO and the various global summit and conference groupings also welcomed new members. In that sense, international relations became more of a 'system' – with a much thicker web of established rules, procedures and discussion fora – than they had been during the cold war.

At the same time international terrorism, violent ethnic conflicts, and the economic and social backwardness in much of Africa, Asia and Latin America make it all too obvious that those (transformed) global structures hold few answers to the daily concerns of a third of the world's population. While the technologies and the scientific knowledge exist with which to cure most of their sufferings, their states and societies critically lack the requisite political, economic and social structures to implement them. In so many ways neither the suffering countries nor the rich are equipped to deal effectively with the crises of the Third World. It may be utopian to expect an even distribution of wealth around the globe, but even timely and substantial improvements seem impossible in a world which is still marked by so much tragic waste of human, economic and intellectual resources during the cold war era.[43]

notes

1. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), *passim*.
2. Jens Hacker, *Deutsche Irrtümer: Schönfärber und Helfershelfer der SED-Diktatur im Westen* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1992).
3. However, some Russian military forces have remained in countries which were once Soviet territories such as Tajikistan and Moldova, which are now deemed part of the 'near abroad'. See Roy Allison, 'Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy', *International Affairs*, 80:2 (2004), pp.277–93.
4. Bruce Russett & John Qneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: Norton, 2001).
5. Any shortlist of readings should include: Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1986, 6th edition); Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977). For an overview, see Ken Booth & Steve Smith (eds), *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
6. See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall, 1968); Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1977); Stephen Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); John G. Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization* (London: Routledge, 1998).

7. Peter Katzenstein, *Small States in the World Economy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
8. Samuel Huntington's theory of a future 'Clash of Civilizations', first published in *Foreign Affairs*, 72:3 (1993), is perhaps the most widely known example. This thesis was expanded in *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
9. See Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Tout empire périra: théorie des relations internationales* (Paris: A. Colin, 1992).
10. See Bush's 'new world order' speech (the phrase was used during the State of the Union speech on 29 January 1991), quoted in Lawrence Freedman & Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991* (London & Boston: Faber & Faber, 1994), p.xliv.
11. Stéphane Courtois et al., *Le livre noir du Communisme* (Paris: Lafont, 1997).
12. Andre Fontaine (translated by D. Paige), *History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Korean War, 1917–1950* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1968).
13. George Kennan writes about his motives for drafting the Long Telegram in his *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (London: Hutchinson, 1968).
14. For an overview, see Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 2000); David Reynolds, *One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945* (London: Penguin, 2000).
15. Noam Chomsky, *Powers and Prospects: Reflections on Human Nature and Social Order* (London: Pluto Press, 1996).
16. Ken Booth, Michael Cox & Tim Dunne (eds), *Empires, Systems, and States: Great Transformations in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
17. A good introductory text to the Second World War is Gerhard Weinberg, *World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). See also Peter Calvocoressi, *Total War: The Causes and Courses of the Second World War*. Volume I: *The Western Hemisphere* (London: Penguin, 1989) for the European war.
18. Antony Polonsky (ed.), *The Great Powers and the Polish Question, 1941–45: A Documentary Study in Cold War Origins* (London: Orbis Books, 1976). Anita Prazmowska, *Britain and Poland, 1939–1943: The Betrayed Ally* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
19. Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000).
20. The economic institutions are usually referred to as the 'Bretton Woods' system, after the 1944 conference where the respective treaties were worked out. The Soviet Union participated in those negotiations but eventually refused to ratify the agreements and to participate in the institutional activities.
21. Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Vladislav Zubok & Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
22. Nils P. Gleditsch et al., 'Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Data Set', *Journal of Peace Research*, 39:5 (2002); for a starting point on American political strategies, see John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of*

Post-War American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, 2nd edition); Raymond L. Garthoff, *A Journey Through the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2001); for the Soviet side, see Malcolm Byrne & Vojtech Mastny (eds), *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991* (Budapest & New York: Central European University Press, 2005).

23. For a good starting point, see Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West* (London: Penguin, 1999); volume 2 is scheduled for publication in 2005; Hubertus Knabe, *Die unterwanderte Republik – Stasi im Westen* (Berlin: Propylaen, 1999).
24. Ann & John Tusa, *The Berlin Airlift* (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1998); William Stiver, 'The Incomplete Blockade: Soviet Zone Supply of West Berlin, 1948–49', *Diplomatic History*, 21:4 (1997), pp.569–602; Zubok & Pleshakov, *Kremlin's Cold War*, pp.51–2.
25. William Stueck, *The Korean War in World History* (Lexington, KT: University of Kentucky Press, 2004); Peter Lowe, *The Origins of the Korean War* (London: Longman, 1995). For a general discussion, see Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History* (New York: Knopf, 2002).
26. See David L. Anderson, *The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); and George Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2002, 4th edition).
27. Much later, in June 1981, a preventive Israeli air strike was carried out against an Iraqi nuclear installation (the Osirak reactor) for this very purpose – the only such case in history so far. It must, however, be pointed out that, at that time, an Iraqi bomb would have had one target, namely Israel, whereas the Soviet atomic arsenal was not built with any such obvious target in sight. On the Osirak raid, see Uri Bar-Joseph, Michael Handel & Amos Perlmutter, *Two Minutes over Baghdad* (London: Routledge, 2003).
28. Robert Bowie & Richard Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
29. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'How the Cold War Was Played', *Foreign Affairs*, 51 (1972–73), pp.181–209.
30. David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).
31. France and China did not sign the NPT until 1992. After 9/11 the USA changed its attitude toward Pakistan (to enlist them for the war against Al Qaeda) and in 2005 they began a new relationship with India, ignoring in both cases their refusal to join the NPT regime. At the same time they stepped up the pressure on other NPT opponents (such as Iran and North Korea). The current state of the Iranian and North Korean proliferation crises was, at the time of writing, still unresolved. For up-to-date information on nuclear proliferation, as well as other contemporary security issues, see <http://www.globalsecurity.org>.
32. Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), *passim*.
33. John Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through the Persian Gulf* (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), pp.337–47, 397–463; Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.238–40; Peter Kornbluh & Malcolm Byrne (eds), *The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History* (New York: New Press, 1993).

34. Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation State* (London: Routledge, 1992); John R. Gillingham, *European Integration 1950–2003: Superstate or Market Economy?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
35. Daniel Yergin & Joseph Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), and Susan Strange, *States and Markets* (London: Pinter, 1994, 2nd edition) are excellent surveys of the key issues.
36. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London: Penguin, 1998), pp.368–74.
37. Joseph E. Stiglitz's *Roaring Nineties: A New History of the World's Most Prosperous Decade* (London: Allen Lane, 2003) and *Globalization and Its Discontents* (London: Allen Lane, 2002) offer a good start for those debates.
38. Friedrich von Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1944).
39. See Gillingham, *European Integration*, *passim*.
40. On globalisation, see John Baylis & Steve Smith (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 2nd edition); Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership* (New York: Basic Books, 2004); A.G. Hopkins (ed.), *Globalization in World History* (New York: Norton, 2002).
41. Club of Rome, *The Limits of Growth* (New York: New American Library, 1972) was the first of their studies. For the politics of eco-pessimism, see Børn Lomborg, *The Sceptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
42. James Kurth, 'Ignoring History: US Democratization in the Moslem World', *Orbis*, 49:2 (2005).
43. For one of the most obvious examples, see Stephen I. Schwarz (ed.), *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons since 1940* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1998).