

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER,
AUGUST 14, 1941

Joint declaration of the President of the United States of America [Franklin Roosevelt] and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security;

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

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Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

“COMMENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE DECISIONS MADE AT THE YALTA CONFERENCE”

By Frank Januszewski, editor of the
Detroit Polish News, typewritten manuscript sent
to Senator Arthur Vandenberg (Rep., Mich.) in
late February or early March 1945

At Yalta a new system of handling international affairs was established and President Roosevelt's signature on the report compels the United States to recognize that system. This system agreed upon by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill destroys a civilization that humanity has been centuries in building. This system means:

1. Morally—recognition of the priority of might before right,
2. Juridically—legalization of aggression,
3. Politically—abolition of democratic principles in international relations,
4. Strategically—end of the balance of power and the recognition of Soviet hegemony,
5. Economically—restriction if not abolition of free trade and consequently of free enterprise. . . .

Anxious to achieve the appearance of personal success, Roosevelt, playing against the hard and inflexible Stalin, lost in every negotiation, whether political or military. At Moscow, Teheran, and Dumbarton Oaks he pursued this policy until it became nothing more than the dictation of Moscow in matters concerning both the conduct of the war and the organization of the peace. . . .

From the standpoint of morals . . . the question of Poland at the Yalta Conference was a test case. Once President Roosevelt referred to Poland as “the inspiration of the world.” Yalta has made Poland an eternal reproach for every decent man or woman. . . .

The Polish cause has become the morality test of the governments of the United States, Great Britain and Russia—a test they must pass in the court of world opinion—for Roosevelt and Churchill did not succeed in camouflaging the partitioning of Poland and depriving it of its independence. . . . In the hour when that violence and crime can no longer be covered, the treatment of Poland will be the yardstick of *our* political morality. . . .

Twice in twenty years a wave of barbarism has swept over the world. The first was the Bolshevik [*sic*] wave of 1918. The second was the fascist in its Italian and later its German manifestation. The third is that of Soviet imperialism. One common characteristic of these waves in their use of all possible technical and scientific methods and processes, a second is their absolute rejection of all ethical principles, whether in relation to domestic or international affairs. . . . It seems now as if the defeat of the Germans will not mean victory of the principles of our civilization but on the contrary, the subjection of this civilization to Soviet barbarism. So it comes to this: either we save our civilization and preserve our way of life or, gradually capitulating, we shall be responsible for the destruction of Western culture. Such is the task facing us.

The Democratic Party has shown that it not only cannot save, it cannot even defend our civilization. If the Republican Party does not feel that the preservation or the loss of the achievements of ages of civilized life and of Christianity is its affair and if it makes no effort to save America and with it the world, we shall not only lose the war but shall be in part responsible for the fall of the civilized world.

GEORGE F. KENNAN'S "LONG TELEGRAM," FEBRUARY 1946

At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is *the* traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was *the* insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on a vast exposed plain in *the* neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with *the* economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with *the* political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned *the* truth about *the* world without or if foreigners learned *the* truth about *the* world within. And they have learned to seek security only in a patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smouldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for *the* first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed *the* economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After *the* establishment of *the* Bolshevik regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle *the* for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found

justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is *the* fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced *the* country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee *the* external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate *the* importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven [by] necessities of their own past and present position to put forward a dogma which [depicts the] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of *a* creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given *a* final coup de grace by *the* rising power of socialism and yields *a* to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of *the* Russian state, for that isolation of *the* Russian population from *the* outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend *the* limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in *the* new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.

It should not be thought from [the] above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on *the* part of all those who put it forward. Many of them are too ignorant of *the* outside world and mentally too dependent to question [their] self-hypnotism, and [many] have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about *the* outside world. In *the* atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this Government, *the* possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth—indeed, their disbelief in its existence—leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to

believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of *the* outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. . . .

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with *the* US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over *the* energies of one of *the* world's greatest peoples and *the* resources of *the* world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which *an* outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously [*sic*] to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force [*is*] undoubtedly *the* greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably *the* greatest it will ever have to face. It should be *the* point of departure from which our political general staff work at *the* present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with *the* same thoroughness and care as *the* solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that *the* problem is within our power to solve—and that without recourse to any general military conflict. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:

1. Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to *the* logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to *the* logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw—and usually does—when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.

2. Gauged against *the Western World* as a whole, *the Soviets* are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on *the degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which the Western World can muster*. And this is *a factor* which it is within our power to influence.
3. *The success of the Soviet system, as a form of internal power, is not yet finally proven*. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive *the supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another*. Lenin's death was *the first* such transfer, and its effects wracked *the Soviet state* for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be *the second*. But even this will not be *the final test*. *The Soviet internal system* will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to *a series of additional strains* which once proved *a severe tax on Tsardom*. We here are convinced that never since *the termination of the civil war* have *the mass of Russian people* been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, *the party has now become a great and—for the moment—highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration*, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, *the internal soundness and permanence of the movement* need not yet be regarded as assured.
4. All Soviet propaganda beyond *the Soviet security sphere* is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.

For these reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart *the problem of how to deal with Russia*. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, *the following comments*:

1. Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with *the same courage, detachment, objectivity, and the same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which a doctor studies an unruly and unreasonable individual*.
2. We must see that our public is educated to *the realities of the Russian situation*. I cannot over-emphasize *the importance of this*. *The press cannot do this alone*. It must be done mainly by *the Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed*

- on *the practical problems* involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of *the picture*. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if *the realities of this situation* were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have *the courage to face, and the sooner the better*. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on *the heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for the Russian people*, is remarkably small. *We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve*. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have *a better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on a realistic and matter-of-fact basis*.
3. Much depends on *the health and vigor of our own society*. World communism is like *a malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue*. This is *the point at which domestic and foreign policies meet*. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve *the internal problems of our own society, to improve the self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people*, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiques. . . .
 4. We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of *the sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in the past*. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by *the experiences of the past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security*. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, *the Russians certainly will*.
 5. Finally we must have *the courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society*. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.

SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES
BYRNES'S SPEECH IN STUTTGART
ON GERMANY'S FUTURE,
SEPTEMBER 6, 1946

I have come to Germany to learn at first hand the problems involved in the reconstruction of Germany and to discuss with our representatives the views of the United States government as to some of the problems confronting us.

We in the United States have given considerable time and attention to these problems because upon their proper solution will depend not only the future well-being of Germany, but the future well-being of Europe.

We have learned . . . that we live in one world, from which we cannot isolate ourselves. We have learned that peace and well-being are indivisible and that our peace and well-being cannot be purchased at the price of peace or the well-being of any other country.

I hope that the German people will never again make the mistake of believing that, because the American people are peace-loving, they will sit back hoping for peace if any nation uses force or the threat of force to acquire dominion over other people and other governments.

In 1917 the United States was forced into the first world war. After that war we refused to join the League of Nations. We thought we could stay out of Europe's wars and we lost interest in the affairs of Europe. That did not keep us from being forced into a second world war.

We will not again make that mistake. We intend to continue our interest in the affairs of Europe and of the world. . . .

The American people want peace. They have long since ceased talk of a hard or a soft peace for Germany. This never has been the real issue. What we want is a lasting peace. We will oppose soft measures which invite breaking the peace. . . .

It is the view of the American government that the German people throughout Germany, under proper safeguards, should now be given the primary responsibility for the running of their own affairs. . . .

Security forces will probably have to remain in Germany for a long period. . . . We are not withdrawing. As long as an occupation force is required in Germany, the Army of the United States will be a part of that occupation force.

The United States favors the early establishment of a provisional German government for Germany. Progress has been made in the American zone in developing local and state self-government in Germany, and the American government believes similar progress is possible for all zones. . . .

While we shall insist that Germany observe the principles of peace, good neighborliness and humanity, we do not want Germany to become the satellite of any power or to live under a dictatorship, foreign or domestic. . . .

The American people want to return the government of Germany to the German people. The American people want to help the German people to win their way back to an honorable place among the free and peace-loving nations of the world.

SPEECH BY J. EDGAR HOOVER,
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, AT THE
ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE
AMERICAN LEGION IN SAN
FRANCISCO, SEPTEMBER 30, 1946

During the past five years, American Communists have made their deepest inroads upon our national life. In our vaunted tolerance for all peoples the Communist has found our "Achilles' heel". . . .

The fact that the Communist Party in the United States claims some 100,000 members has lulled many Americans into feeling[s] of false complacency. I would not be concerned if we were dealing with only 100,000 Communists. The Communists themselves boast that for every Party member there are ten others ready to do the Party's work. These include their satellites, their fellow-travelers and their so-called progressive and phony liberal allies. They have maneuvered themselves into positions where a few Communists control the destinies of hundreds who are either willing to be led or have been duped into obeying the dictates of others.

The average American working man is loyal, patriotic and law-abiding. He wants security for his family and himself. But in some unions the rank and file find themselves between a Communist pincers, manipulated by a few leaders who have hoodwinked and browbeaten them into a state of submission. . . .

The Communist influence has projected itself into some newspapers, magazines, books, radio and the screen. Some churches, schools, colleges and even fraternal orders have been penetrated, not with the approval of the rank and file but in spite of them. . . .

We are rapidly reaching the time when loyal Americans must be willing to stand up and be counted. The American Communist Party, despite its claims, is not truly a political party. The Communist Party in this country is not working for the general welfare of all our people—it is working against our people. It is not interested in providing for the common defense. It has for its purpose the shackling of America and its conversion to the Godless, Communist way of life.

. . . Its unprincipled converts would sell America short if it would help their cause of furthering an alien way of life . . . whose ultimate aim is the destruction of our cherished freedom. Let us no longer be misled by their sly propaganda and false preachments on civil liberty. They want civil license to do as they please and, if they get control, liberty for Americans will be but a haunted memory. For those who seek to provoke prejudice and stir up the public mind to angry resentment against our form of government are a menace to the very powers of law and order which guarantee and safeguard popular rights.

We, of this generation, have faced two great menaces in America—Fascism and Communism. Both are materialistic; both are totalitarian; both are anti-religious; both are degrading and inhuman. In fact, they differ little except in name. Communism has bred Fascism and Fascism spawns Communism. Both are the antithesis of [the] American belief in liberty and freedom. If the peoples of other countries want Communism, let them have it, but it has no place in America.

HENRY A. WALLACE'S SPEECH IN NEW YORK CITY,

During the past year or so, the significance of peace has been increased

immeasurably by the atom bomb, guided missiles and airplanes which soon will travel as fast as sound. Make no mistake about it—another war would hurt the United States many times as much as the last war. We cannot rest in the assurance that we invented the atom bomb—and therefore that this agent of destruction will work best for us. He who trusts in the atom bomb will sooner or later perish by the atom bomb—or something worse.

To achieve lasting peace, we must study in detail just how the Russian character was formed—by invasions of Tartars, Mongols, Germans, Poles, Swedes, and French; by the czarist rule based on ignorance, fear and force; by the intervention of the British, French and Americans in Russian affairs from 1919 to 1921; by the geography of the huge Russian land mass situated strategically between Europe and Asia; and by the vitality derived from the rich Russian soil and the strenuous Russian climate. Add to all this the tremendous emotional powers which Marxism and Leninism give to the Russian leaders—and then we can realize that we are reckoning with a force which cannot be handled by a "Get tough with Russia" policy. "Getting tough" never bought anything real and lasting—whether for schoolyard bullies or businessmen or world powers. The tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get. . . .

We must not let our Russian policy be guided or influenced by those inside or outside the United States who want war with Russia. This does not mean appeasement.

We must earnestly want peace with Russia—but we want to be met half way. We want cooperation. And I believe that we can get cooperation once Russia understands that our primary objective is neither to

For her part, Russia can retain our respect by cooperating with the United Nations in a spirit of open-minded and flexible give-and-take.

The real peace treaty we now need is between the United States and Russia. On our part, we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe and the United States. We may not like

will try to socialize it in spite of influence just as we try to democratize our sphere of influence.

The Russians have no more business in stirring up naive communists to political activity in Western Europe, Latin America and the United States than we have in interfering in the politics of Eastern Europe and Russia.

Under friendly peaceful competition the Russian world and the American world will gradually become more alike. The Russians will be forced to grant more and more of the personal freedoms, and we shall become more and more absorbed with the problems of social-economic justice.

Russia must be convinced that we are not planning for war against her and we must be certain that Russia is not carrying on territorial expansion or world domination through native communists faithfully following every twist and turn in the Moscow party line. . . . There will always be an ideological conflict—but that is no reason why diplomats cannot work out a basis for both systems to live safely in the world side by side. . . .

In the United States an informed public opinion will be all-powerful. Our people are peace-minded. But they often express themselves too late—for events today move much faster than public opinion. The people here, as everywhere in the world, must be convinced that another war is not inevitable. And through mass meetings such as this, and through persistent pamphleteering, the people can be organized for peace—even though a large segment of our press is propagandizing our people for war in the hope of scaring Russia. And we who look on this war-with-Russia talk as criminal foolishness must carry our message direct to the people—even though we may be called communists because we dare to speak out.

I believe that peace—the kind of peace I have outlined tonight—is the basic issue, both in the Congressional campaign this fall and right on through the Presidential election in 1948. How we meet this issue will determine whether we live not in “one world” or “two worlds”—but whether we live at all.

PRESIDENT HARRY S.
TRUMAN'S SPEECH TO
CONGRESS, MARCH 12, 1947

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.

One aspect of the present situation, which I present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey. . . .

The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the Government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. . . .

Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek Army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore authority to the Government throughout Greek territory.

Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. . . .

Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention. . . . Since the war Turkey has sought additional financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East. . . .

As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help. . . .

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental

issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.

To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. . . .

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. . . .

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider sit-

uation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East. . . .

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. . . .

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel. . . .

If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the executive and legislative branches of the Government must work together.

This is a serious course upon which we embark.

I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious. The United States contributed \$341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace.

The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than 1/10 of 1 percent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain. . . .

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation.

STALIN TO "POLITBURO FOUR"
 ([VYACHESLAV] MOLOTOV,
 [LAVRENTI] BERIA, [ANASTAS]
 MIKOYAN, AND [GEORGY]
 MALENKOV) CIPHERED [CODED]
 TELEGRAM, DECEMBER 9, 1945

Analyzing the international events for the period from the London conference of five ministers to the forthcoming conference of three ministers in Moscow, one can come to the following conclusions.

1. Thanks to our tenacity we won the struggle over the issues which had been discussed in London. The conference of the three ministers in Moscow signifies a retreat of the U.S.A. and England from their positions in London since this conference will now work without China's involvement on European questions and without France's involvement on questions concerning the Balkans.
2. We won the struggle in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The testimony to this are the results of elections in those countries. If we had stumbled on the issues regarding those countries and had not held on, then we would have definitely lost there.
3. At some point you [Molotov] gave in to pressure and intimidation on the part of the U.S., began to stumble, adopted the liberal course with regard to foreign correspondents, and let your government be pilloried by those correspondents in expectation that this would placate the U.S. and Britain. Of course, your calculation was naive. I feared that with this liberalism you would undercut our policy of tenacity and thereby let our state down. At that time the entire foreign press yelled that Russians were caving in and would make concessions. But an accident helped you and you returned in time to the policy of tenacity. It is obvious that in dealing with partners such as the U.S. and Britain, we cannot achieve anything serious if we begin to give in to intimidation or betray uncertainty. To get

foreign press

anything serious from partners of this kind, we must arm ourselves with a policy of tenacity and steadfastness.

4. The same policy of tenacity and steadfastness should be our guide in our working toward the conference of three ministers.

A COMPILATION OF [WRITTEN]
COMMENTS ON DRAFT TREATIES
REGARDING DEMILITARIZATION
AND DISARMAMENT OF GERMANY
AND JAPAN PROPOSED BY [U.S.
SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES]
BYRNES, JUNE 8, 1946 (COMPILED
BY COMRADES NOVIKOV AND
ZARUBIN OF MFA [MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS], U.S.S.R.)

Enclosed in: Molotov to Stalin, 8 June 1946

[About] Draft Treaty regarding demilitarization and disarmament of Germany
[Several] comrades . . . voiced their opposition to the proposed drafts giving a number of reasons. Analyzing those arguments one can draw the conclusion that in proposing this treaty the American government is pursuing the following goals:

1. To shorten the duration of Germany's occupation.
2. To disrupt the receipt of reparations from Germany by the Soviet Union.
3. To weaken controls over Germany.
4. To undermine the influence of the U.S.S.R. on issues related to Germany and other European countries.
5. To replace the task of real military and economic disarmament of Germany with the opposite goal of preserving Germany as a strong power.
6. To speed up Germany's reconstruction in order to use Germany against the Soviet Union.
7. To undo all the jointly arrived-at Allied decisions on Germany.

What follow are individual [written] statements by different comrades on each of these goals.

1. To shorten the duration of Germany's occupation.

- a) The [proposed] treaty on disarmament and demilitarization of Germany is designed to dismantle the occupation of Germany (Comm. [A. A.] Andreev).

- b) The Soviet occupation serves not only to democratize a part of Germany, but also to weaken reactionary forces in its other parts; that is why Americans and the British seek to hasten its termination (Com. [M. I.] Kalinin).
- c) Byrnes' proposal in reality leads to the termination of occupation, which was designed to bring about a real disarmament and liquidation of industry that can be used for war purposes (Com. [L. M.] Kaganovich). . . .
- g) The Americans would like to end the occupation of Germany as soon as possible and to remove the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. from Germany, and then to demand a withdrawal of our troops from Poland, and ultimately from the Balkans (Com. [G. K.] Zhukov). . . .

2. To disrupt the receipt of reparations from Germany by the Soviet Union.

- a) The American draft is designed to complicate the receipt of our reparations from Germany (Com. Andreev).
- b) The draft treaty does not provide for the continuation of getting reparations from Germany, [thus] endangering the issue of vital importance to the U.S.S.R. (Com. [V. G.] Dekanozov). . . .

4. To undermine the influence of the U.S.S.R. on issues related to Germany and other European countries.

- a) Byrnes' draft is calculated to push us out of Germany as soon as possible, whereby Americans want to get ahead and look kinder in German eyes in order to bring Germany to their side against us (Com. Andreev). . . .
- c) Byrnes' move pursues the provocative goal of presenting us as "cold-hearted" and themselves as benign "peacemakers" (Com. Kaganovich).
- d) Given the established practice of building blocs between the U.S., Great Britain, and other countries, the role of the Soviet Union in controlling Germany's demilitarization and disarmament will be jeopardized (Com. [N. M.] Shvernik). . . .

5. To replace the task of real military and economic disarmament of Germany with the opposite goal of preserving Germany as a strong power.

- a) The proposal does not include the liquidation of all German industry which may be used for military production; it also fails to include the transfer of production capacity not needed for Germany's civilian industry to the U.S.S.R. and other Allies under the rubric of reparations (Com. Shvernik). . . .

- c) The draft treaty bypasses a number of important decisions made at the Crimea and Berlin [Potsdam] conferences, including measures to decentralize . . . Germany's economic might (Com. [A. I.] Vyshinsky).
- d) The measures proposed . . . deal only with control over disarmament without tackling all the issues of liquidation of or real control over German industry and of rooting out any Nazi and militaristic influence from the German people's life, as was provided for by the decisions of the Crimea conference (Com. [L. A.] Govorov).
- e) In Germany there are still plenty of . . . specialists who would be ready, given the chance and weakened control over Germany, to begin restoring Germany as a state and as a military-industrial force (Com. N. N. Voronov). . . .

6. To speed up Germany's reconstruction in order to use Germany against the Soviet Union.

- b) Fearful of consolidation of growing anti-fascist and anti-capitalist forces, the Americans and British are in haste to "normalize" conditions for the resurrection of a reactionary, bourgeois Germany in order to prevent the complete rooting out of fascism (Com. Kaganovich).
- c) The withdrawal of Soviet and other troops from Germany is in the interest of England and the U.S.A. since it gives [their] capitalists freedom of action and provides an opportunity to strengthen reactionary elements in all of Germany through private channels (Com. Kalinin). . . .
- e) Economic and political unification of Germany under American leadership would also mean a military revival of Germany and, in a few years, a German-British-American war against the U.S.S.R. (Com. [S. A.] Lozovsky). . . .

THE [NIKOLAI] NOVIKOV REPORT ["TELEGRAM"]

Washington, 27 September 1946

[All underlining replicates that of Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov.]

U.S. Foreign Policy in the Postwar Period.

The foreign policy of the United States, which reflects the imperialist tendencies of American monopolistic capital, is characterized in the postwar period by a striving for world supremacy. This is the real meaning of the many statements by President Truman and other representatives of American ruling circles: that the United States has the right to lead the world. All the forces of American diplomacy—the army, the air force, the navy, industry, and science—are enlisted in the service of this foreign policy. For this purpose broad plans for expansion have been developed and are being implemented through diplomacy and the establishment of a system of naval and air bases stretching far beyond the boundaries of the United States, through the arms race, and through the creation of ever newer types of weapons.

1. a) The foreign policy of the United States is conducted now in a situation that differs greatly from the one that existed in the prewar period. . . .

b) . . . Europe has come out of the war with a completely dislocated economy, and the economic devastation that occurred in the course of the war cannot be overcome in a short time. All of the countries of Europe and Asia are experiencing a colossal need for consumer goods, industrial and transportation equipment, etc. Such a situation provides American monopolistic capital with prospects for enormous shipments of goods and the importation of capital into these countries—a circumstance that would permit it to infiltrate their national economies. . . .

c) . . . [W]e have [also] seen a failure of calculations on the part of U.S. circles which assumed that the Soviet Union would be destroyed in the war or would come out of it so weakened that it would be forced to go begging to the United States for economic assistance. Had that happened, they would have been able to dictate conditions permitting the United States to carry out its expansion in Europe and Asia without hindrance from the USSR.

In actuality, despite all of the economic difficulties of the postwar period connected with the enormous losses inflicted by the war and the German fascist occupation, the Soviet Union continues to remain economically independent of the outside world and is rebuilding its national economy with its own forces.

At the same time the USSR's international position is currently stronger than it was in the prewar period. Thanks to the historical victories of Soviet weapons, the Soviet armed forces are located on the territory of Germany and other formerly hostile countries, thus guaranteeing that these countries will not be used again for an attack on the USSR. . . .

Such a situation in Eastern and Southeastern Europe cannot help but be regarded by the American imperialists as an obstacle in the path of the expansionist policy of the United States.

2. a) The foreign policy of the United States is not determined at present by the circles in the Democratic party that (as was the case during Roosevelt's lifetime) strive to strengthen the cooperation of the three great powers that constituted the basis of the anti-Hitler coalition during the war. The ascendance to power of President Truman, a politically unstable person but with certain conservative tendencies, and the subsequent appointment of [James] Byrnes as Secretary of State meant a strengthening of the influence on U.S. foreign policy of the most reactionary circles of the Democratic party. . . .

b) At the same time, there has been a decline in the influence on foreign policy of those who follow Roosevelt's course for cooperation among peace-loving countries. Such persons in the government, in Congress, and in the leadership of the Democratic party are being pushed farther and farther into the background. The contradictions in the field of foreign policy existing between the followers of [Henry] Wallace and [Claude] Pepper, on the one hand, and the adherents of the reactionary "bi-partisan" policy, on the other, were manifested with great clarity recently in the speech by Wallace that led to his resignation from the post of Secretary of Commerce. . . .

3. Obvious indications of the U.S. effort to establish world dominance are also to be found in the increase in military potential in peacetime and in the establishment of a large number of naval and air bases both in the United States and beyond its borders.

In the summer of 1946, for the first time in the history of the country, Congress passed a law on the establishment of a peacetime army, not on a volunteer basis but on the basis of universal military service. The size of the army, which is supposed to amount to about one million persons as of July 1, 1947, was also increased significantly. The size of the navy at the conclusion of the war decreased quite insignificantly in comparison with wartime. At the present time, the American navy occupies first place in the world, leaving England's navy far behind, to say nothing of those of other countries. . . .

The establishment of American bases on islands that are often 10,000 to 12,000 kilometers from the territory of the United States and are on the other side of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans clearly indicates the offensive nature of the strategic concepts of the commands of the U.S. army and navy. . . .

All of these facts show clearly that a decisive role in the realization of plans for world dominance by the United States is played by its armed forces.

4. a) One of the stages in the achievement of dominance over the world by the United States is its understanding with England concerning the partial division of the world on the basis of mutual concessions. The basic lines of the secret agreement between the United States and England regarding the division of the world consist, as shown by facts, in their agreement on the inclusion of Japan and China in the sphere of influence of the United States in the Far East, while the United States, for its part, has agreed not to hinder England either in resolving the Indian problem or in strengthening its influence in Siam and Indonesia. . . .

5. a) If the division of the world in the Far East between the United States and England may be considered an accomplished fact, it cannot be said that an analogous situation exists in the basin of the Mediterranean Sea and in the countries adjacent to it. . . . The United States . . . is not interested in providing assistance and support to the British Empire in this vulnerable point, but rather in its own more thorough penetration of the Mediterranean basin and Near East, to which the United States is attracted by the area's natural resources, primarily oil. . . .

c) The irregular nature of relations between England and the United States in the Near East is manifested in part also in the great activity of the American naval fleet in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. Such activity cannot help but be in conflict with the basic interests of the British Empire. . . .

It must be kept in mind, however, that [recent] incidents . . . and the great interest that U.S. diplomacy displays in the problem of the [Turkish] straits have a double meaning. On the one hand, they indicate that the United States has decided to consolidate its position in the Mediterranean basin. . . . On the other hand, these incidents constitute a political and mil-

Military
US interests in Near East

itary demonstration against the Soviet Union. The strengthening of U.S. positions in the Near East . . . will therefore signify the emergence of a new threat to the security of the southern regions of the Soviet Union. . . .

7. a) The "hard-line" policy with regard to the USSR announced by Byrnes after the rapprochement of the reactionary Democrats with the Republicans is at present the main obstacle on the road to cooperation of the Great Powers. It consists mainly of the fact that in the postwar period the United States no longer follows a policy of strengthening cooperation among the Big Three (or Four) but rather has striven to undermine the unity of these countries. The objective has been to impose the will of other countries on the Soviet Union. . . .

b) The present policy of the American government with regard to the USSR is also directed at limiting or dislodging the influence of the Soviet Union from neighboring countries. In implementing this policy in former enemy or Allied countries adjacent to the USSR, the United States attempts, at various international conferences or directly in these countries themselves, to support reactionary forces with the purpose of creating obstacles to the process of democratization of these countries. In so doing, it also attempts to secure positions for the penetration of American capital into their economies. Such a policy is intended to weaken and overthrow the democratic governments in power there, which are friendly toward the USSR, and replace them in the future with new governments that would obediently carry out a policy dictated from the United States. In this policy, the United States receives full support from English diplomacy.

c) One of the most important elements in the general policy of the United States, which is directed toward limiting the international role of the USSR in the postwar world, is the policy with regard to Germany. In Germany, the United States is taking measures to strengthen reactionary forces for the purpose of opposing democratic reconstruction. Furthermore, it displays special insistence on accompanying this policy with completely inadequate measures for the demilitarization of Germany.

The American occupation policy does not have the objective of eliminating the remnants of German Fascism and rebuilding German political life on a democratic basis, so that Germany might cease to exist as an aggressive force. . . . Instead, the United States is considering the possibility of terminating the Allied occupation of German territory before the main tasks of the occupation—the demilitarization and democratization of Germany—have been implemented. This would create the prerequisites for the revival of an imperialistic Germany, which the United States plans to use in a future war on its side. One cannot help seeing that such

Germany

a policy has a clearly outlined anti-Soviet edge and constitutes a serious danger to the cause of peace.

d) The numerous and extremely hostile statements by American government, political, and military figures with regard to the Soviet Union and its foreign policy are very characteristic of the current relationship between the ruling circles of the United States and the USSR. These statements are echoed in an even more unrestrained tone by the overwhelming majority of the American press organs. Talk about a "third war," meaning a war against the Soviet Union, and even a direct call for this war—with the threat of using the atomic bomb—such is the content of the statements on relations with the Soviet Union by reactionaries at public meetings and in the press. At the present time, preaching war against the Soviet Union is not a monopoly of the far-right, yellow American press represented by the newspaper associations of Hearst and McCormick. This anti-Soviet campaign also has been joined by the "reputable" and "respectable" organs of the conservative press, such as the *New York Times* and *New York Herald Tribune*. . . .

The basic goal of this anti-Soviet campaign of American "public opinion" is to exert political pressure on the Soviet Union and compel it to make concessions. Another, no less important goal of the campaign is the attempt to create an atmosphere of war psychosis among the masses, who are weary of war, thus making it easier for the U.S. government to carry out measures for the maintenance of high military potential. It was in this very atmosphere that the law on universal military service in peacetime was passed by Congress, that the huge military budget was adopted, and that plans are being worked out for the construction of an extensive system of naval and air bases.

e) Of course, all of these measures for maintaining a high military potential are not goals in themselves. They are only intended to prepare the conditions for winning world supremacy in a new war, the date for which, to be sure, cannot be determined now by anyone, but which is contemplated by the most bellicose circles of American imperialism.

Careful note should be taken of the fact that the preparation by the United States for a future war is being conducted with the prospect of war against the Soviet Union, which in the eyes of American imperialists is the main obstacle in the path of the United States to world domination. This is indicated by facts such as the tactical training of the American army for war with the Soviet Union as the future opponent, the siting of American strategic bases in regions from which it is possible to launch strikes on Soviet territory, intensified training and strengthening of Arctic regions as close approaches to the USSR, and attempts to prepare Germany and Japan to use those countries in a war against the USSR.

THE MINISTER OF STATE SECURITY APPEALS FOR MEASURES TO CLOSE DOWN BRITISH PROPAGANDA IN THE U.S.S.R.

2 November 1946

To Comrade A[ndrei] Zhdanov,

The MGB [Ministry of State Security] is receiving information about negative influence of the journal *Britansky Soyuznik* [*British Ally*], published in the Soviet Union, on some contingents of Soviet readers.

Systematically published in the pages of this journal are articles which directly or indirectly pursue one goal—to create an impression among Soviet readers about advantages of daily life, culture, and "democracy" in the "British Commonwealth" as compared to the Soviet Union. For example:

- a) in a series of articles on the new system of social security . . . , a notion is being foisted upon readers about the well-being of English workers and the unremitting concern of the British government about them;
- b) systematically published are articles depicting unprecedented flowering of science in British colonies, with special attention given to work of native scientists and the allegedly favorable conditions under which they work;
- c) in all kinds of reports and short stories of outwardly innocent nature, British everyday life is being described in such a way and with such detail as to create among Soviet readers an impression of unusually high material level [standard of living] of an average Englishman;
- d) a number of articles seek to justify British policy in Greece, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, etc.;
- e) the so-called weekly reviews of press and events published in every issue of the journal usually contain biased, falsified interpretation of international problems camouflaged by an outwardly objective presentation of "facts."

The journal systematically publishes detailed reports on statements of the leaders of the British government and some reactionary members of the Parliament containing distorted depictions of the Soviet government's foreign policy.

The journal *Britansky Soyuznik* has a circulation of fifty thousand copies and is widely disseminated in the Soviet Union. . . . A large percentage of the journal's circulation (10,300 copies) is distributed through retail sales and gets into hands of accidental readers.

Among the journal subscribers one can find teachers, professors, and writers.

Articles published in the journal are often assessed incorrectly by some readers and in a number of cases some of them, referring to the journal's information, actually contribute to dissemination of the British propaganda in their surroundings. Thus, a faculty member of the Peat Institute, V. Rakovsky, using "facts" from *Britansky Soyuznik*, stated that bourgeois-democratic regimes have a number of advantages over socialism, and that natives in the British colonies live well and have no hostility toward Englishmen. In his words, the allies' military equipment and their successes in the last war were superior to the Soviet ones. . . .

There have been cases in which some military personnel sent letters to the journal editors expressing their warmest gratitude for the publication of "the indispensably valuable material that helps to really appraise our ally."

Such uncritical attitude toward *Britansky Soyuznik* is explained in part by some readers' conviction that this journal is being censored by proper Soviet authorities and that therefore its materials are objective. The journal readers are also disoriented by the absence of a reference to the journal's being an organ of the British Foreign Office; that is why they mistake it for a Soviet publication.

Probably it would be expedient to charge the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee with consideration of the problem of *Britansky Soyuznik* and with mapping out practical measures to suppress the influence of this harmful journal on Soviet readers and restrict its distribution through retail sale.

Requesting your instructions,

V[ictor] Abakumov

Sent to: Stalin, Zhdanov

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN PARIS, JUNE 25, 1947

1. The Soviet delegation's preliminary task is to obtain from the French and British foreign ministers information on the nature and conditions of the proposed economic assistance to Europe. The delegation should clarify in particular the questions about scale, forms, and terms of this assistance.
2. The delegation should also request from the French and British delegations information on British-French talks in Paris on June 17-18, and in particular should ask to be familiarized with their experts' documentation.
3. Since the delegation can hardly expect to get satisfactory information from the French and British ministers on the nature and conditions of American assistance to Europe, the delegation should propose that the ministers send a request to the U.S. government about American economic aid and credits (i.e., their size, interest, time limits, etc.), as well as about whether European countries can be confident of Congressional approval of the aid proposed by the administration.
4. The Soviet delegation must be guided by the presumption that the matter of American economic assistance to Europe is to be handled not through compiling a [common] economic program for European countries, but through identifying their economic requirements and needs for American assistance (in credits and goods) and compiling individual requests on a country-by-country basis. In following this line the delegation should not allow the ministers' meeting to concentrate on investigating and inspecting European countries' resources. Such attempts are to be rejected on the

grounds that the meeting's main purpose is to identify the needs of European countries and the readiness of the U.S.A. to satisfy them, but not to compile economic plans for European countries.

5. When the discussion gets to the point of identifying European countries' needs (requests) for American assistance and thereby to the problem of enlarging the number of countries involved, the Soviet delegation should propose to give priority to those European countries which were subject to German occupation and which contributed to the cause of victory. In case French and British delegations insist on including other European countries in this discussion, the Soviet delegation may give consent to their participation with the proviso that former enemy countries—Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria, and Finland—are invited only for consultation.
6. When discussing specific proposals related to American aid to Europe, the Soviet delegation should object to those conditions of this aid that might infringe upon the sovereignty and the economic independence of European countries.
7. At the discussions the delegation should object to attempts to use German economic resources for the needs of European countries as well as attempts to provide U.S. economic assistance to Germany since the German question can be discussed only by the Council of Foreign Ministers and not by this meeting.

RECORD OF I[OSEF] V[ISSARIONIVICH] STALIN'S CONVERSATION WITH THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT DELEGATION ON THE ISSUE OF THEIR POSITION REGARDING THE MARSHALL PLAN AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH THE U.S.S.R.

Moscow, 9 July 1947

SECRET

Present: Comrade I. V. Stalin, Comrade V. M. Molotov, Prime Minister of [the] Czechoslovak Republic [K.] Gottwald, Minister of Foreign Affairs [J.] Masaryk, Minister of Justice [P.] Drtina, General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic Gendrih [Heidrich?], and Czechoslovak Ambassador Gorak [Horák].

Comrade Stalin asks Gottwald, what questions do you have for us?

Gottwald responds that they would like to discuss three main questions:

1. participation at the Paris Conference on July 12, 1947,
2. the Czechoslovak Republic's treaty with France,
3. trade negotiations between the Czechoslovak delegation and the [Soviet] Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Comrade Stalin asks Gottwald which question they would like to begin with.

Gottwald responds that they would prefer to begin with the first question.

Comrade Stalin says that approximately two or three days after comrade V. M. Molotov returned from Paris, the Yugoslavs asked us what should they do—whether to take part in the conference on July 12 in Paris, or not. They expressed their opinion that they were thinking about refusing to participate in that conference. Later on Romania and Bulgaria addressed us with the same question. Initially, we thought that we should recommend that they go to that conference and then ruin it. We were convinced, on the basis of the materials that we received from our ambassadors, that under the

cover of credit assistance to Europe they were organizing something like a western bloc against the Soviet Union. Then we made a firm decision and announced our opinion to everybody that we are against participation in this conference. . . .

We were surprised that you decided to participate in this conference. For us, this issue is the issue of friendship between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic. Objectively, you are helping, whether you want it or not, . . . to isolate the Soviet Union. Look what is happening. All the countries which have friendly relations with us are not going to participate in this conference, while Czechoslovakia, which also enjoys friendly relations with us, will. Therefore, they will decide that the friendship between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Soviet Union is not all that solid, if it was so easy to put Czechoslovakia on the side of isolating the Soviet Union, against the Soviet Union. This would be seen as a victory over the Soviet Union. Our people and we will not understand this. You need to rescind your decision, you need to refuse to participate in this conference—and the sooner you do it, the better.

Masaryk asks Comrade Stalin to take into account that the Czechoslovak government was aware of the dependence of the Czechoslovak industry on the West. Representatives of industry believed it was expedient to participate in the conference, so that they would not miss an opportunity to get credits. At the same time, the Polish delegation arrived in Prague and told us that they decided to participate in the conference in Paris. As a result, the decision of the Czechoslovak government to participate in the conference in Paris on July 12, 1947 was taken unanimously by all political parties.

Then Masaryk continues that he was not going to deny the responsibility that he was also in favor of participating in the conference. However, he was asking [Stalin] to take into account that by making this decision, neither he nor the government of the Czechoslovak Republic wanted to do anything bad against the Soviet Union. In conclusion, Masaryk asks Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov to help to make their situation easier.

Comrade Molotov notes to Masaryk that even the fact of your participation in the conference by itself would be against the Soviet Union.

Masaryk responds that he, the government, all the parties, and the entire Czechoslovak people do not want to do, and will not do, anything against the Soviet Union.

Comrade Stalin says that we never doubted and do not doubt your friendship toward us, but objectively it looks different in reality.

Dratina says that he, on his [own] behalf and on behalf of all members of the party to which he belongs, states that if our decision is against the So-

viet Union, then my party does not want to, and will not do it. My party will not do anything which would give any reason to interpret our actions as being against the Soviet Union. At the same time, Dratina is asking [Stalin] to take into account that the Czechoslovak Republic . . . depends on western countries for up to 60 percent of its exports and imports.

Comrade Stalin notes that Czechoslovakia has a passive trade balance with the West, and that Czechoslovakia has to export its currency to the West.

Dratina says that he has in mind the volume of import and export, and that the people of the Czechoslovak Republics [*sic*] believe that if we do not participate in that conference, then we would not get the credits, and, therefore, we would lower the living standards of our population because the trade between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Soviet Union has sharply decreased in 1947. Dratina finishes his comments with the request to help them get out of the existing situation, to increase trade with Czechoslovakia.

Comrade Stalin says that we need some goods which we can get from Czechoslovakia, for example, pipes for petroleum industry, rails for narrow railroad cars, and so on, and we can help Czechoslovakia, i.e. we could sign a trade treaty which would be beneficial for both sides.

Gottwald says that Czechoslovakia exports a lot of consumer and textile goods to the West, and the Soviet Union, so far, has not been buying them.

Comrade Stalin says, why, we will.

Gottwald asks Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov to write it down in the communique, so that the others would see what the Soviet Union is willing to give them as a result of this visit of the Czechoslovak delegation.

Masaryk and Dratina ask Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov to help them to formulate their refusal to participate in the conference in Paris.

Comrade Stalin says that they need to see how the Bulgarians formulated their refusal, to consult among themselves, and to draft needed formulations of the reasons for the refusal. . . .

Gottwald says that he has several smaller questions, and that he will write to Comrade Stalin about them.

Comrade Stalin agrees.

In concluding the conversation, Comrade Stalin reminds Gottwald and all members of the Czechoslovak delegation that it is necessary to refuse to participate in the conference in Paris today, i.e. July 10, 1947 [the conference having lasted beyond midnight].

Masaryk says that they will discuss this question tomorrow [presumably, for Masaryk, the 10th], and only toward evening would they be able to send their opinion to the government.

Comrade Stalin says that they would need to do it immediately.

The delegation thanks Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov for the reception and for the needed advice, and promises to do everything as they agreed to do.

Recorded by BODROV

RECORD OF THE MEETING
OF COMRADE I[OSEF]
V[ISSARIONIVICH] STALIN WITH
THE SECRETARY OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY
[MAURICE] THOREZ

Moscow, 18 November 1947

[Also] Present: Molotov, Suslov.

[Thorez begins the conversation with an expression of respect and gratitude to Comrade Stalin on behalf of all members of French Communist Party (FCP) and the Central Committee (CC) of the FCP.]

Com[rade] Stalin asks jocularly if Thorez is thanking him for the fact that in Warsaw [at the meeting of the Cominform in September 1947] the French communists were berated. . . .

Thorez responds that the Communist Party of France is all too grateful for having been told about its shortcomings. . . .

Thorez says that the estimate of the situation presented at the conference of nine communist parties is being brilliantly corroborated in France. In particular, the interference of the Americans in the country is increasing, economic difficulties are worsening, class struggle is growing more acute. The French Communist Party, according to the instructions of the conference of the nine, is waging a struggle in defense of the country's independence and is fighting alone against the entire coalition of reactionary forces. At the last municipal elections the [FCP] managed to preserve and even partially increase the number of its voters. . . .

Com. Stalin says that the struggle against the Marshall Plan should not be put forward too crudely. The [noncommunist] socialists will say that the communists are against accepting loans from Americans. The answer should be: no, not against. Communists are for loans, but on such conditions that will not harm national sovereignty. Communists are against the enslaving conditions that impinge upon the independence of France. This is how the Communists should formulate the issue. . . .

Thorez says that, [at] the conference of the nine communist parties, . . . representatives of some fraternal communist parties sometimes subjected the FCP to unfair criticism. For instance, in particular the Yugoslav comrades reproached the [FCP] for having joined the resistance struggle all too late and for not ensuring the people's power at the moment of France's liberation. Thorez says that, in his opinion, this criticism is not justified. In order to gain a chance to correctly inform the party masses of France and not to disorient them, Thorez would like to know the opinion of Com. Stalin on this issue. . . . The fact that the [FCP] failed to seize power during the liberation of the country in August 1944 is explained by [several] reasons of an international nature. The [FCP] at that time directed its efforts to advocate the speediest opening of the second front, intensification of the war and bringing closer a victory over Germany. The [FCP] was in the rearguard of American and British armed forces.

Com. Stalin says that it would be completely different story had the Red Army been positioned in France. . . .

Com. Stalin says that the French communists could not [have] seize[d] power at that time. Even had they seized it, they would have lost it then, because of the presence of Anglo-American troops in the country.

. . . Com. Stalin says that the Yugoslav comrades . . . owe much to the fact that their country was liberated by the Red Army. Had Churchill delayed opening the second front in northern France by a year, the Red Army would have come to France. Com. Stalin says that we [in Moscow] toyed with the idea of reaching Paris. . . .

Com. Stalin says that, of course, the Anglo-Americans could not afford such a scandal, that the Red Army should liberate Paris while they sat on the shores of Africa.

Thorez says that he can assure Com. Stalin that the French people would have enthusiastically received the Red Army.

Com. Stalin observes that then it would have been quite a different picture. . . . [Then Stalin inquires if the French communists have stockpiles of arms. Do they consider it necessary to have them?]

Thorez responds that the CC of the [FCP] authorized two comrades . . . to deal specifically with this issue. . . . They conduct work among old guerrillas, create organizations of paramilitary nature. The [FCP] managed to conceal a whole number of depots with armaments and ammunition.

Com. Stalin says that one must have armaments and organization if one does not want to become disarmed before the enemy. Communists could be attacked and then they should fight back. There can be all kinds of situations. Com. Stalin says that we [the Soviet Union] have arms and we can give them, if it becomes necessary. . . .

REPORT BY L. P. BERIA AND I. V. KURCHATOV TO I. V. STALIN ON PRELIMINARY DATA RECEIVED DURING THE ATOMIC BOMB TEST

The testing area
(170 km west
of Semipalatinsk)
To Comrade Stalin I.V.

30 August 1949
Top Secret
(Special Importance)

This is to report to you that due to the efforts of many Soviet scientists, designers, engineers, managers, and workers of our industry over four years of strenuous work, your assignment to create a Soviet atomic bomb has been fulfilled.

The creation of the A-bomb in our country has been achieved thanks to your daily attention, care, and help in [finding the] solution of this problem.

Being reported are preliminary data on the results of the test of the first copy of plutonium-charged A-bomb that was designed and built by the First Chief Directorate of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers under scientific guidance of Academician Kurchatov and the bomb's chief designer, corresponding member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Professor Khariton:

On August 29, 1949 at 4 A.M. Moscow time (7 A.M. local time), in a remote steppe region of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic 170 km west of Semipalatinsk, at the specially constructed and equipped testing ground, there was obtained the explosion of the U.S.S.R.'s first atomic bomb, [one with] exceptional destructive and striking power.

The atomic explosion was recorded with special instruments as well as through personal observation of a large group of scientists, military and other experts, including members of the Special Committee, Comrades Beria, Kurchatov, Pervukhin, Zavenyagin and Makhnev, who took a direct part in the test.

Among experts there was Physicist Mesheryakov, who was one of our observers at the Bikini atomic bomb test.

I. OBSERVATION OF THE ATOMIC EXPLOSION

The phenomenon observed by all the participants leaves no doubt that the explosion was really an atomic one since it was accompanied by all the characteristics of a full-fledged atomic explosion including:

- a) formation of the shock-wave of enormous destructive power;
- b) formation of intense emission of light [modern term: thermal radiation] which had huge incendiary and destructive power non-existent in usual explosives;
- c) formation of intensive initial nuclear radiation (of neutron and gamma-rays) possessing specific destructive effects and characteristic only of atomic explosions.

The characteristic features of the explosion of August 29 recorded by scientists and military observers were the following:

1. Precisely at the designated time at the bomb installation site (on the 30 meters high steel tower at the testing ground center) there occurred an atomic burst many times brighter than the sun. In $\frac{1}{4}$ of a second the burst took the shape of a hemisphere expanding to dimensions of 400-500 meters in diameter.
2. Concurrently with the light burst there formed an explosion cloud reaching in 2-3 minutes several km in height and breaking into the usual rain clouds that covered the sky during the test.
3. The light burst was followed by the emergence of an atomic explosion shock-wave of enormous power.

The explosion fireball and shock-wave thunder were observed by the experts and witnesses over a distance of 60-70 km away from the explosion site. . . .

CONCLUSIONS

Scientific-technical data received during the first 36 hours after the explosion demonstrate that the A-bomb design . . . has the following characteristics:

- a) the explosion yield is equivalent to a simultaneous explosion of no less than 10,000 tons of TNT;

- b) the shock-wave caused the complete destruction of industrial installations and brick houses within a radius of 1,500 m (i.e., 7 square km, or 700 hectares) and complete destruction of wooden buildings within a radius of 3 km (i.e., 12-30 square km . . .);
- c) the bomb has . . . radioactive effect on living organisms, creating a zone of lethal danger to humans within a radius of 1,200 m from the epicenter (i.e., 5 square km . . .) and a not yet fully researched but clearly hazardous zone of no less than 1,500 m (i.e., 7 square km . . .) . . .

The full report on the test results will be submitted to you in 1 to 1.5 months.

For the English translation of Stalin's order of August 20, 1945, setting up the Special Committee, see *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, no. 6-7: 269-270, which can now be supplemented by publication in English of point thirteen (previously classified and now released for the cited volume on the U.S.S.R. Atomic Project (p. 13):

13. To charge Com. Beria with organizing intelligence work abroad in order to obtain more comprehensive technical/economic information on uranium industry and A-bombs; to put Com. Beria in charge of all intelligence work in this field conducted by intelligence agencies (NKGB [i.e., People's Commissariat of State Security], RUKA [i.e., Red Army Intelligence Directorate], and others).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

CITATIONS FOR DOCUMENTS ACCOMPANYING SECTION 1, THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

1. "The Atlantic Charter," *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941*, comp. Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Harper, 1950), pp. 314-315.
2. "Comments on the Yalta Conference," John Foster Dulles papers (box 27, Vandenberg file), Selig G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University Archives.
3. "Kennan's Long Telegram," *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*, ed. Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 50-63.
4. "Byrnes's Speech," *Vital Speeches*, 15 September 1946, pp. 706-709.
5. "Hoover's Speech," *Vital Speeches*, 15 October 1946, pp. 10-11.
6. "Wallace's Speech," *Vital Speeches*, 1 October 1946, pp. 738-741.
7. "Truman's Speech," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman 1947* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 176-180.

CITATIONS FOR DOCUMENTS ACCOMPANYING SECTION 2, THE RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

(Note: Basic translations were made as indicated; C. Earl Edmondson provided editorial assistance in the translation of documents 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8.)

issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.

To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. . . .

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. . . .

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and

uation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East. . . .

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. . . .

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel. . . .

If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the executive and legislative branches of the Government must work together.

This is a serious course upon which we embark.

I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious. The United States contributed \$341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace.

The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than 1/10 of 1 percent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain. . . .

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation.